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The Philippines is one of the largest exporters of wild reef fish for the aquarium 
trade. As such, it provides livelihoods across the country. However, there are 
concerns that its overharvest and damaging fishing techniques have irreversible 
effects on ecosystems. Accordingly, there have been attempts to introduce policies 
which tackle damaging practices, such as cyanide fishing. Yet the success of these 
policies is variable. This project in Calatagan, in the Philippines, provides baseline 
information to understand and strengthen aquarium fishery management. 
Participatory techniques with aquarium fishers and government officials explore the 
de-facto practices in an aquarium fishery, and local perceptions of benefits and 
legitimacy in fishery management. Policy-practice gaps form as de-jure rules are 
translated into rules-in-use. Firstly, as national and local policies are implemented 
on-the-ground, and then through inconsistent enforcement. Other than cyanide 
bans, no rules specifically control aquarium fishing, this includes issuing special 
collection permits. Despite gaps at the local government level, fishers show high 
awareness and compliance to de-jure rules, thus reducing policy-practice gaps. 
Voluntary compliance can be explained through positive perceptions. For example, 
perceptions that cyanide bans yield benefits. Although a few positive perceptions 
exist, an overriding coercive incentive to comply is discovered. The threat of local 
government banning aquarium fishing creates compliance which may be less 
effective in the long-term. Aquarium fishers lack support from the local government 
and are rarely involved in de-jure fishery management. This indicates a lack of 
perceived legitimacy, and is also perceived as a limitation for future use of the 
aquarium fishery. However, aquarium fishers demonstrate an awareness of 
sustainable practices through use of their own social norms for collecting aquarium 
fish. By increasing aquarium fisher involvement in de-jure management, both social 
and environmental needs could be considered. Thus, creating effective management 
for future use of the fishery.   
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The trade of wildlife products directly impacts wild populations of fauna and flora. In 
the case of the marine aquarium trade, live reef fish are harvested directly from coral 
reefs to supply the luxury, and therefore often controversial, fish keeping hobby 
(Wood 2001; Wabnitz et al. 2003). However, over-exploitation of reef fish is 
frequently observed, and damaging harvest techniques have irreversible effects on 
coral reefs (Rubec 1986; Rubec 1988; Kolm and Berglund 2003; Shuman et al. 2005).  
The Philippines is among the top three global exporters of wild aquarium fish, a trade 
that supports many coastal livelihoods and is driven by global consumer demand 
(Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010). However, the Philippines are also under heavy 
environmental degradation, with coral reefs faring poorly as dependence by local 
communities continues to grow (Rubec 1986; Muallil et al. 2013). With importing 
countries increasing pressure on illegal fishing in the Philippines, the national 
government have revised fishery policies that ban the use of damaging techniques, 
such as stating higher sanctions for fishing with sodium cyanide (Dee et al. 2014; 
Talbot 2015). Due to the environmental concerns about the aquarium trade, this 
study plans to investigate the realities of management within an aquarium fishery in 
Calatagan, in the Philippines, for instance the actual prevalence of sodium cyanide 
fishing.  
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Surprisingly, among the aquarium fishers in Calatagan, an alternative picture is 
shown. Destructive fishing with sodium cyanide is found to be low and therefore not 
the controversial problem in this aquarium fishery. However, despite the aquarium 
fishers using environmentally friendly techniques with specialised nets, communities 
perceive that future use of Calatagan’s aquarium fishery is hindered. This study 
provides a deeper insight into the influences on an aquarium fishery; exploring social 
aspects, local governance and on-the-ground fishery management.  
The management of aquarium fisheries involves implementing and enforcing rules, 
and can also integrate cooperation with local communities. Governance brings an 
element of power to management. Governing bodies, such as local government and 
fisheries agencies, have the power to design rules which are written into policies.  
Successful implementation of government policies as rules-in-use can vary, and thus 
effective management on-the-ground can also suffer. For example, not all the rules 
stated in policies may be implemented and enforced locally. This can result from 
weak governance and a lack of consideration of local livelihood needs (Robbins et al. 
2009; Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010; Dee et al. 2014).  
Policies used to manage resources, such as aquarium fisheries, contain de-jure rules 
stating which activities are legal or illegal (Dee et al. 2014). These rules have 
attributes that can be extracted, studied and compared across contexts (Crawford 
and Ostrom 1995; Basurto et al. 2009). Such attributes as conditions and sanctions of 
the rules can be used for comparing the de-jure rules and de-facto practices, and 
therefore the reality for fishery management. By doing so, we can better understand 
management and specifically, the gap between policy (de-jure) and practice (de-
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facto) (Basurto et al. 2009; Carmenta et al. 2013). In reality, de-jure rules exist as 
rules-in-use, which govern the de-facto practices, and thus result in the policy-
practice gap (Ostrom 1990; Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010; Cole 2014). For example, 
when the fishers do not accept de-jure rules non-compliance would arise (cf. Robbins 
et al. 2009). Compliance with the rules is necessary for resource management to 
have its desired effects. When de-jure rules are misaligned to local livelihood needs, 
the harvesters will have few incentives to comply with the de-jure rules (Grafton 
2000; Pascual et al. 2014; Solomon et al. 2015). In Calatagan, although do gaps are 
found to exist between policy and practice, there is also a degree of alignment. For 
example, the high levels of compliance among aquarium fishers. This introduces the 
question of what incentives do the aquarium fishers have to comply with de-jure 
rules. 
Ostrom put forth the idea that when harvesters can participate in designing and 
enforcing rules, resource management may be more appropriate and effective 
(Ostrom 1990). More fisher participation will also increase positive perceptions of 
legitimacy in management, such as fairness and trust, which in turn increases 
incentives to comply (Tyler 1990; Hatcher et al. 2000; Nielson 2003). Yet, cooperation 
between the local government and aquarium fishers are severely lacking in this 
study. With low legitimacy in Calatagan’s aquarium fishery management, alternative 
approaches may explain the high compliance among fishers.  
According to the ‘Reasoned Action Model’ developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010), 
incentives to comply can arise from perceived benefits and legitimacy in de-jure 
rules, social norms, and the possession of skills, knowledge and time to alter illegal 
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behaviours (Tyler 1990; Fishbein and Ajzen 2010; Arias 2015). These incentives will 
influence voluntary compliance, and so the success of aquarium fishery management 
(Arias 2015). For instance, where there are perceptions that the de-jure rules 
banning destructive fishing practices yields benefits aquarium fishers are more likely 
to comply in the rules (Tyler 1990; Nielson 2003). The rules would be more aligned 
with livelihood needs, and social or moral obligations to comply would also exist 
(Keane et al. 2008; Arias 2015). Thus, incentives to comply will in turn reduce policy-
practice gaps (Stern 2008; Arias 2015). Therefore, management authorities must 
consider the social realities and perceptions of aquarium fishers, including their 
participation, for effective and sustainable management of the aquarium trade 
(Ostrom 1990; Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010).  
In this study, communities of aquarium fishers in the Philippines will be studied. 
Through structured comparison of the de-jure policies and de-facto practices, the 
rules-in-use for aquarium fishery management will be understood. Perceptions of 
benefits and legitimacy in de-jure rules are explored, to show their influence on 
fisher compliance, and thus policy-practice gaps. Finally, fisher perceptions are used 
to assess the effectiveness of existing management for future use of the fishery, with 
the application of Ostrom’s eight principles for effective resource management.  
1.2. Aims and Research Questions 
The aim of this study is to understand the management of an aquarium fishery in the 
Philippines, by identifying policy-practice gaps and aquarium fisher perceptions of 
existing management.  
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Two overriding questions will be the basis for research: 
1. What are the de-facto practices in aquarium fishery management, and how do 
they differ to the de-jure rules? 
i. Identify de-jure rules which govern aquarium fishing.  
ii. Understand the rules-in-use, de-facto enforcement, and fisher awareness of 
de-jure rules. 
iii. Gather estimates of non-compliance through a specialised questioning 
technique. 
iv. Learn about the day-to-day lives of aquarium fishers, including which 
techniques are commonly used for aquarium fishing.  
2. How do the fishers perceive existing aquarium fishery management?  
i. Recognise themes in fisher perceptions of benefits and legitimacy in de-jure 
rules. 
ii. Explore whether existing management is perceived as effective for future use 
of the aquarium fishery. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. The Aquarium Trade 
2.1.1. Background 
The trade of wildlife products targets thousands of species worldwide (Phelps et al. 
2016). Animals and plants alike are caught, farmed and sold to consumers as meat, 
pets, medicinal products and luxury items, to name a few. Whilst most focus is on 
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large and charismatic species, such as elephant and rhino, many less familiar species 
tend to be overlooked (Phelps et al. 2016). The wildlife trade encompasses both 
illegal and legal activities, each with management challenges; even for the legal 
wildlife trade sustainability is difficult to achieve. Over a 9-year period in South East 
Asia alone, over 35 million animals were recorded in legal international trade, 30 
million of which were wild caught. These species included butterflies, reptiles, 
mammals, birds and fish (Nijman 2010). However, these figures apply only to species 
listed on the Convention for International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES), while 
most fish species traded for aquariums, are not CITES listed suggesting that previous 
recorded estimates for traded fish are ever higher (Wabnitz et al. 2003; Rhyne et al. 
2012). 
The US is a huge importer of aquarium fish from the Philippines, with the two 
countries holding many trade links (Rhyne et al. 2017). Rhyne et al. (2017) calculated 
a figure just shy of 1,800 aquarium fish imported into the US over one year, between 
2009 and 2011. Import records for aquarium fish entering the US, lack identification 
to the species level, and are instead listed under a generic code. This insufficient 
monitoring highlights a lack of clarity over the amount of species involved in the 
aquarium trade (Rhyne et al. 2017). Yet, existing trade numbers portray the 
magnitude of wild fish populations that are continuously impacted by global 
demand, which could increase further with improved identification and monitoring 
(Rhyne et al. 2012). The Philippines were among the first countries to begin trading 
aquarium fish and are one of the largest global exporters, therefore harvesting a 
huge amount of wild reef fish (Wabnitz et al. 2003; Leal et al. 2016).  
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2.1.2. Impacts 
The aquarium trade can have positive effects for society, yet negative impacts on the 
environment. At the harvester level, fishing for the aquarium trade provides vital 
jobs across approximately 45 developing countries (Wood 2001). For example, in the 
Philippines, small rural communities face few job opportunities and the aquarium 
trade can provide an essential source of income (Wabnitz et al. 2003).  
Yet, reliance on wild species for economic stability can result in overexploitation of 
the resource (see Hardin 1968). The subsequent removal of biodiversity from coral 
reefs leads to widespread controversy (Wabnitz et al. 2003). For example, fishing 
pressure on the Indonesian Banggai Cardinalfish (Pterapogon kauderni), a popular 
aquarium fish, has resulted in lower population densities and smaller group sizes 
(Kolm and Berglund 2003). In 2017, the collection of Banggai Cardinalfish was 
proposed for regulation under CITES (CITES 2017), due to its risk of overexploitation. 
However, this was opposed by Indonesia, another large exporter of aquarium fish 
(Wabnitz et al. 2003; CITES 2017). The collection of sea anemones from Cebu, in the 
Philippines, has also led to lower population densities in exploited areas (Shuman et 
al. 2005). Due to the interconnected nature of ecosystems, the removal of one 
species will consequently impact others; by removing sea anemones from their 
natural habitat, anemonefish population sizes have declined by 80% (Shuman et al. 
2005). A coral reef is host to a large diversity of ecological relationships, where 
species have evolved to coexist and depend on one another (Dee et al. 2014). 
Therefore, harvesting aquarium fish without suitable management, can have 
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extensive impacts on the coral reef ecosystem, with future consequences for human 
livelihoods.  
The impacts of harvesting aquarium fish are further exacerbated when they are 
collected using destructive techniques (Barber and Pratt 1998). Cyanide fishing was 
first observed in the Philippines in 1962, and has spread across country due to the 
ease and quantity with which fishers can maximise their catch (Rubec 1986; Fabinyi 
and Dalabajan 2010; Dee et al. 2014). This technique consists of using a squeeze 
bottle containing a substance of sodium cyanide powder and seawater, which is 
squirted into coral reef crevices. The chemical substance stuns and paralyses the fish, 
allowing efficient collection (Wabnitz et al. 2003). However, sodium cyanide is a 
poisonous substance, which can affect target and non-target organisms (Rubec 
1988). It is extremely detrimental to coral; it kills symbiotic zooxanthellae algae, 
which some coral species require for respiration. The resulting effect is coral 
bleaching, with direct coral death in high cyanide doses (Jones and Steven 1997). 
Cyanide is also damaging to the fishes’ liver, leading to extremely high instant and 
delayed mortality rates (Rubec 1988). Of the fish caught by cyanide fishing, only 20-
30% have been found to survive the first few days following capture, and 98% of fish 
die within one year of being sold due to their poor health (Smith 1984; Rubec 1986; 
Millar 2013).  
Coral reefs provide essential habitats for one third of the worlds marine fish species, 
as well as providing an important source of income for millions of people in tropical, 
developing countries (Paulay 1997; Wabnitz et al. 2003). The Philippines lies in the 
centre of global coral reef biodiversity. Thirty years ago, 71% of the Philippine’s coral 
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reefs were found to be in poor to fair condition, partially due to over-harvest and 
widespread cyanide fishing (Rubec 1986). More recent research on the impacts of 
destructive fishing in the Philippines, has found coral cover to have declined by 67% 
over 2 years (Russ and Leahy 2017). Additionally, evidence from the Philippines 
shows that most small-scale fisheries, including food fisheries, are unsustainable to 
the point of fishery collapse (Muallil et al. 2013). Therefore, fishing techniques which 
are detrimental to coral reefs, deny the long-term use of resources which reefs 
provide. To combat unsustainable practices used in aquarium fishing, effective 
management schemes are necessary (Wood 2001; Dee et al. 2014).  
2.2. Managing aquarium fisheries  
2.2.1. A Common Pool Resource   
To better understand how the fragility of aquarium fisheries leaves them susceptible 
to overexploitation, their depletable and renewable nature allow the fisheries to be 
thought of as common pool resources (CPR) (Ostrom et al. 1999). A common pool 
resource is where one harvester’s exploitation of the resource reduces the amount 
available for others, and when the exclusion of harvesters is difficult and costly to 
achieve (Ostrom et al. 1999). For instance, if one fisher collects large volumes of fish, 
regardless of the costs to the remaining population, there will be even less left for 
other fishers. The short-term benefits of this one fisher maximising personal gain will 
only create negative impacts for the future as fish populations are depleted (Hardin 
1968). This process of decimating a common pool resource, was termed the ‘Tragedy 
of the Commons’. In Hardin’s opinion, the best way to prevent the tragedy of the 
commons is to privatise lands, restricting access to resources for only select 
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individuals, for instance by government ownership (Hardin 1968). However, Ostrom 
takes a different route that humans are norm-using, and that alternative solutions to 
government ownership exist, such as increasing the involvement of harvesters in CPR 
management (Ostrom et al. 1999; Ostrom 1999). 
Managing common pool resources is a challenging task, as it requires understanding 
a variety of interplaying factors (Ostrom 2009). For example, replenishment of 
aquarium fisheries after depletion relies on the life history traits of its species (Kolm 
and Berglund 2003). Therefore, for aquarium fisheries to exist as a sustainable 
common pool resource, they will require appropriately designed management 
regimes which consider its complex ecological interactions and dynamics (Ostrom 
1999; Kolm and Berglund 2003; Dee et al. 2014). As well as these ecological features, 
the reliance of coastal communities on fishery resources means that social influences 
also play a significant role in aquarium fisheries. Aquarium fishing provides an 
income to support families living within rural, coastal areas (Wabnitz et al. 2003). 
Additionally, aquarium fishing is a consumer driven livelihood with huge global 
demand from public aquariums and hobbyists for aquarium fish. With growing 
human populations and pressure on coral reef ecosystems, there is a mounting 
necessity to design effective management for aquarium fisheries and trade (Wabnitz 
et al. 2003).  
2.2.2. Current management schemes 
In response to the increasing pressure on coral reef species, several states and 
countries involved in the aquarium trade have introduced new de-jure rules that seek 
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to enable legal and sustainable trade (Wood 2001; Dee et al. 2014).  These regimes 
span from international regulations to national policies, and even locally designed 
rules specific to a subset of communities (Dee et al. 2014). For the structural analysis 
of de-jure rules, they can be defined using a grammatical syntax, called the ADICO 
syntax, developed by Crawford and Ostrom (1995). Here, rules are conceptualised 
into 5 sub-components (Basurto et al. 2009). Within each rule there is an attribute 
(A); the persons to whom the rules apply, the deontic (D), for example ‘must not’, 
‘must’, ‘it is prohibited to’, the aim (I) of the rule, such as what actions are prohibited 
or required. For each rule, there must also be conditions (C); when or where the rule 
must be followed, and finally, the sanctions, ‘or else’ (O), if the rule is not followed 
(Crawford and Ostrom 1995). For instance, “Fishermen are banned from using 
damaging harvest techniques during fishing trips. The use of damaging harvest 
techniques will result in confiscation of equipment and catch” (Basurto et al. 2009). 
The underlined phrases represent each of the 5 sub-components which define this as 
a rule. This syntax is useful for comparing de-jure rules within policy documents, and 
also for comparison of de-jure rules and de-facto practices (see Chapter 3).  
Popular de-jure rules for managing aquarium fisheries have included placing 
restrictions on damaging fishing techniques and the establishment of catch limits and 
no-fishing areas, to prevent over-harvest (Wood 2001). For instance, Indonesia has 
implemented a ban on cyanide fishing and created Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), 
which so far have appeared to be a useful form of management (Dudley and Ghofar 
2006). The Maldives also placed a ban on destructive fishing techniques and 
established annual export quotas of 100,000 reef fish and invertebrates which is 
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monitored through regular reports from fishers and exporters (Edwards and 
Shephard 1992). In Australia, permits are issued to collectors each year to monitor 
collection efforts (Wood 2001).  
On a wider scale, the countries which import wild reef fish for the aquarium trade 
have also implemented rules, with the aim of minimising illegal and destructive 
fishing in the exporting countries. For instance, the U.S. Lacey Act prohibits the 
importation of species collected by illegal methods. However, cyanide caught species 
may be unknowingly imported, due poor enforcement in exporting countries and 
difficultly in detecting cyanide in collected species (Calado et al. 2014).  Following a 
threat by the EU in 2014 to ban trade with the Philippines if the country did not 
address all illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, the national government 
created an agreement with New England Aquarium to gather and assess data on the 
Philippine’s aquarium exports (Talbot 2015). Consequently, steps are being taken by 
the Philippine government with the aim of increasing fishery sustainability. The 
undersecretary for the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, stated a “mandate 
to take out all unsustainable practices as it creates poverty in the long term” (Talbot 
2015). Aquarium fisheries in the Philippines are governed by a national policy created 
in 1998: Fisheries Code RA 8550, which is managed nationwide by the Bureau of 
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) (Pomeroy et al. 2010). Following the New 
England Agreement, stricter enforcement ensued on the Philippines national ban on 
destructive fishing techniques, including cyanide fishing (Dee et al. 2014). For 
instance, 2014 amendments to the 1998 Fisheries Code included increases in the 
sanctions for fishing with sodium cyanide (Policy RA 10654).  
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A range of options for sustainably managing both aquarium fishing and trade have 
been proposed, such as gear restrictions, species quotas and monitoring of 
exports/imports (Wood 2001). Nonetheless, international agreements and 
nationwide laws may not be sufficient for increasing the sustainability of aquarium 
fisheries, as implementing rules at the harvester level can be problematic. Failure to 
effectively implement and enforce rules results in gaps forming between policy and 
practice (Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010; Carmenta et al. 2013). These gaps can be 
attributed to weak governance, as well as mismatches between de-jure 
rules/management schemes and the lives of local fishers (Dee et al. 2014; cf. Pascual 
et al. 2014). To be able to minimise policy-practice gaps, we need understand how 
they can arise. 
2.3. Policy-Practice gaps 
Government run schemes and policies are often unsuccessful in managing common 
pool resources (Ostrom 1999). This results in the rules-in-use for resource 
management, and the de-facto practices they govern, differing to the de-jure rules 
defined in policies (Robbins et al. 2009; Carmenta et al. 2013). The ultimate effect 
will be a gap between policy (de-jure) and practice (de-facto) (Cole 2014). There are 
many reasons why policy-practice gaps will form. One important reason is the 
mismatch between policy objectives and the livelihood needs of local harvesters 
(Schendel and Abrahams 2005; Pascual et al. 2014). When this is the case, de-jure 
rules can be altered as they are implemented at the harvester level. For instance, 
when harvesters lack incentives to follow the de-jure rules, due to a mismatch with 
their livelihood needs, they can construct their own social norms for using the 
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resource (Schendel and Abrahams 2005). Though licit (socially sanctioned) rules, 
these social norms may also be illegal (Figure 1) (Schendel and Abrahams 2005; 
Abrahams 2006; Phelps 2013). This was observed in a forest reserve in India where 
access was banned for local harvesters through de-jure rules, but the forest was still 
used for grazing, fodder collection, fuelwood and tree-felling (Robbins et al. 2009). 
Open-access was permitted through locally negotiated bribes to the forest guards. 
This occurred because the de-jure rules were mismatched to the needs of an 
impoverished community (Robbins et al. 2009). Licit and illicit social norms could 
affect the management of aquarium fisheries and influence how policy-practice gaps 











Figure 1: Forms of state and social authority (Abrahams 2006). 
The social norms will act as unwritten rules, contributing to the rules-in-use for 
resource management (Schendel and Abrahams 2005). The rules-in-use describe the 
reality of management schemes, for instance they can be combinations of 
implemented de-jure rules and social norms, controlling the de-facto practices on-
the-ground (Phelps 2013; Cole 2014). Therefore, the influence of social norms can 
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result in large differences forming between the de-jure rules and existing de-facto 
practices (Cole 2014). In communities where harvesters are highly dependent on the 
resource, for subsistence or income, they may have few alternatives once resource 
access is restricted and so will revert to non-compliance (Robbins et al. 2009). 
Similarly, aquarium fishers will have their own preferences for how the resource 
should be managed, due to local livelihood needs which the government may be 
indifferent to (Cole 2014). This process of implementing de-jure rules on-the-ground, 
creates a gap between policy and practice (Ostrom 1990).  
Ostrom and colleagues have provided useful ways of thinking about how these 
policy-practice gaps can be reduced (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999; Grafton 2000; 
Cole 2014). Eight principles were devised to address some of the difficulties in 
managing common pool resources. She compiled evidence from long-lasting 
management schemes of CPRs and enforced the need to consider community rights 
for increasing incentives to comply (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2009). For instance, she 
states that permitted resource use must be related to local conditions, and 
harvesters should participate in designing and enforcing the rules (Table 1).  
Table 1: Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) “eight design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR 
institutions”. 
1. Clearly defined boundaries Individuals or boundaries who have rights to 
withdraw resource units from the CPR must be 
clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR 
itself 
2. Congruence between 
appropriation and provision 
rules and local conditions 
Harvest rules restricting time, place, technology, 
and/or quantity of resource units are related to local 
conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, 
material and/or money 
3. Collective-choice 
arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can 
participate in modifying the operational rules 
4. Monitoring Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and 
harvester behaviour, are accountable to the 
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harvesters or are the harvesters 
5. Graduated sanctions Harvesters who violate operational rules are likely to 
be assessed by graduated sanctions (depending on 
seriousness and context of the offence) by other 
harvesters, by officials accountable to these 
harvesters, or by both 
6. Conflict-resolution 
mechanisms 
Harvesters and their officials have rapid access to 
low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among 
harvesters or between harvesters and officials 
7. Minimal recognition of 
rights to organise 
The rights of harvesters to devise their own 
institutions are not challenged by external 
government authorities 
8. Nested enterprises Harvest, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution and governance activities are organised in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises 
When the de-jure rules in management schemes lack such principles, there is a risk of 
marginalising harvesters. (Ostrom 1990; Pascual et al. 2014). Alternatively, when 
rules are designed collectively, the government can provide advice and support to 
the community, while harvesters are able to communicate their ideas and concerns 
to authorities (Grafton 2000). Sharing management over the resource allows 
harvesters to develop on existing de-jure rules and design locally-derived rules, which 
are then legalised by the government (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Feeny 1990). 
Therefore, greater harvester participation could mean a closer match between 
policies and local livelihood needs. This would lead to a wider acceptance of de-jure 
rules within the community (Pascual et al. 2014). Effective management of aquarium 
fishing relies on the acceptance and compliance of fishers to the de-jure rules (cf. 
Pascual et al. 2014). The harvesters would have less need to ignore or alter the de-
jure rules, and incentives to comply would increase. In doing so, the policy-practice 
gap can also be reduced. There are various ways in which incentives to comply are 
created (Arias 2015). By understanding what influences these incentives, fishery 
management can attempt to achieve long-term and effective management.  
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2.4. Perceptions 
Compliance is necessary for de-jure rules to have their desired impacts and for 
conservation efforts to be successful; without compliance, the rules would be 
unusable (Keane et al. 2008; Solomon et al. 2015). Non-compliance occurs in a 
variety of conservation-derived rules, such as timber extractions, forest fires, 
poaching, and over-fishing (Robbins et al. 2006). Yet, non-compliance is complex to 
study; it takes place on many levels from individual behaviours to community-wide 
social norms (Keane et al. 2008). To understand non-compliance, the “5 W’s” need to 
be addressed; the who, what, when, where and most importantly, why people chose 
to break rules (Arias 2015).  
Occasionally, decisions of when or when not to comply can be based merely on the 
estimated economic gain or loss of following de-jure rules, and such dilemmas can be 
tackled by increasing enforcement (Nielson 2003). For instance, effective 
enforcement and high sanctions would increase compliance rates (Nielson 2003; 
Keane et al. 2008; Arias 2015). Enforcement is coercive compliance. It deters non-
compliance by prosecuting rule breakers. However, if governance is weak, and 
susceptible to a lack of sufficient resources or corruption, effective enforcement and 
thus compliance will suffer (Keane et al. 2008). This was seen in the Comoros Islands, 
when funding ran low for a Marine Protected Area enforcement was reduced and 
illegal activities restarted (Poonian et al. 2008). 
Voluntary compliance is more effective in the long-term. It will not only provide a 
buffer when enforcement decreases, but also demonstrates effective management 
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schemes that are aligned to local livelihood needs (Arias 2015). In these cases, de-
jure rules will gain more acceptance within harvester communities (Keane et al. 
2008). Voluntary compliance is influenced by positive incentives, which can create 
social and moral obligations to comply (Keane et al. 2008). Positive incentives include 
perceptions, for instance when harvesters perceive that the management and de-
jure rules yield benefits, or are legitimate due to feelings of fairness, trust and 
involvement (Nielson 2003; Mills et al. 2013). The perceptions of aquarium fishers 
towards de-jure rules are therefore an important aspect to consider when looking at 
compliance. 
To explain the instance of non-compliance behaviours, Fishbein and Ajzen provided a 
widely-used model, the ‘Reasoned Action Model’, developed from the ‘Theory of 
Planned Behaviour’ (Ajzen 1991; Fishbein and Ajzen 2010) (Figure 1). This model has 
previously been used to understand non-compliance behaviours in other contexts 
(see Poulter et al. 2008; Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). 
 
Figure 2: The Reasoned Action Model from Fishbein and Ajzen (2010). 
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The Reasoned Action Model; is summed into three beliefs; behavioural, normative 
and control beliefs (Figure 2). The model integrates an individual’s environment, 
social interactions and internal beliefs to predict behavioural changes, such as 
altering between legal and illegal behaviours (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). Firstly, 
behavioural beliefs are the perceived benefits and costs of changing a behaviour, 
such as direct or indirect benefits provided by the rules. Secondly, normative beliefs 
involve social obligations (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). These are complex as they delve 
into social norms; the social pressure on how an individual should or should not 
behave. Normative beliefs relate to the illicit and licit rules within communities, for 
example socially undesirable behaviours versus the socially desirable (Schendel and 
Abrahams 2005). Individuals will feel a social pressure to abide by social norms, and 
moving away from the ‘norm’ will result in social policing (Ostrom 1997; Fishbein and 
Ajzen 2010). Yet, the Reasoned Action Model does not include perceptions of 
legitimacy in its normative beliefs. Legitimacy can also effect social obligations to 
comply as it is affected by fairness and trust towards management authorities. A 
wider normative approach also considers legitimacy as an internal incentive to 
comply (Tyler 1990; Nielson 2003). For instance, if there is perceived legitimacy, 
loyalty can form between harvesters and authorities. This legitimacy is influenced by 
perceptions of fairness, trust and harvester involvement in de-jure management 
schemes (Nielson 2003). Lastly, control beliefs are the available factors that either 
hinder or aid in altering a behaviour, such as skills, knowledge or time (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 2010). For example, whether fishers possess the skills for changing their well-
practised fishing techniques (Arias 2015). These aspects will interact in a 
multifaceted system to explain human behaviour in decision making. A combination 
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of these incentives results in one’s decision to perform a behaviour, such as using 
legal fishing techniques instead of illegal (Figure 2) (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010; Arias 
2015).  
2.4.1. Perceived benefits  
The benefits associated with compliance to the de-jure rules will influence the 
incentives of aquarium fishers. Fishers will accept new rules when they are perceived 
to yield benefits, human and/or environmental (Arias 2015). Benefits derived from 
the rules can be direct or indirect. Direct benefits can be in the form of increased 
income, for example if sustainably caught fish command a greater value, higher fish 
survival, or if the community feel empowered through increased involvement and 
responsibility in fishery management (Wabnitz et al. 2003; cf. Stern 2008). Indirect 
benefits would be ensuring future use of the fishery, for example through the 
protection of coral reef habitats and species abundance, thus ensuring continued 
livelihoods for future generations of aquarium fishers (cf. Arias 2015).  
The perceived benefits will vary between fishers and government officials, as the 
benefits each gain will differ (cf. Carmenta et al. 2013). The management of a Marine 
Protected Area (MPA) in Kenya is an example of this, and illustrates how the design 
of a management scheme was mismatched with community needs (McClanahan et 
al. 2004). Government officials were under the assumption that the fishermen 
benefitted from the MPA, while the fishermen shared no perceived benefits 
(McClanahan et al. 2004). This demonstrates that government and harvesters will 
differ in their understanding of the issues in resource management. Governments 
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are not always aware of local perceptions and enforcement can be ineffective, thus 
reducing local incentives to comply (Ostrom 1999; Grafton 2000; Nielson 2003).  
2.4.2. Perceived legitimacy 
Alongside the perceived benefits, perceptions about legitimacy are also highly 
influential on compliance with de-jure rules (Tyler 1990; Hatcher et al. 2000; Nielson 
2003). The term legitimacy can be defined by perceptions of fairness and trust in 
authorities, and harvester involvement in resource management (Tyler 1990). When 
positive perceptions about these aspects exist, social and moral obligations will be 
created for voluntary compliance (Arias 2015). Fairness exists when everyone is 
treated equally by the rules, for example in the benefits they receive, and when the 
rules are enforced equally across communities (Stern 2008). Perceived fairness of the 
rules would increase when fishers feel involved in the decision making and the 
management of resources (cf. Tyler 1990; Hatcher et al. 2000; Nielson 2003). Trust in 
government officials has been observed as a key factor in the acceptance rules, and 
for increasing positive perceptions. Trust is influenced by an individuals’ past 
experiences, and like fairness, can increase through more involvement (Ostrom 1997; 
Stern 2008). Therefore, perceptions of legitimacy are improved when fishers have 
had positive experiences with authorities and have cooperated in fishery 
management (cf. Nielson 2003). Ineffective management of a food fishery in 
Palawan, in the Philippines, was partly due to a lack of participation among fishers in 
the decision-making process. This caused negative perceptions about the 
government, and a lack of fisher awareness of the de-jure rules (Fabinyi and 
Dalabajan 2010). This example illustrates that effective management of a fishery 
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requires active involvement of the fishers, which will in turn increase perceptions of 
legitimacy.  
Communication between government officials and fishers has been proven to lead to 
successful management regimes. Repeated interactions and communication with 
one another allows reciprocity and trust to form between individuals (Ostrom 1997). 
In the Philippines, successful fishery management on San Salvador island is due to 
the introduction of community-based management. The involvement of all fishers in 
decision making, and shared responsibility in enforcement, consequently led to 
raised awareness of the need for sustainability (Katon et al. 1999; Pomeroy et al. 
2010). The result was effective implementation of a marine sanctuary, to which there 
is now a high compliance among locals. Subsequently, San Salvador island has seen 
improved habitats, biodiversity and species abundance (Katon et al. 1999). 
Transformed incentives led to social norms arising within the community; those who 
do not cooperate will fall outside of the social norm, and may even be punished via 
social policing (Ostrom 1997; Katon et al. 1999). Incentives shifted from self-interest 
at the cost of others to those which will benefit the collective good. Increased 
communication has been observed to address problems in common pool resource 
management, as extensive as issues of climate change and transboundary pollution 
which prevail at much larger scales (Dietz et al. 2003).   
2.5. Conclusion 
Growing research on the social factors within governance has targeted effective CPR 
management and the drivers of non-compliance, yet there is still a need to apply the 
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social sciences within conservation schemes (see Nielson 2003; Hampshire et al. 
2004; Kahler and Gore 2012; Carmenta et al. 2013; Bennett et al. 2016). These 
studies highlight the importance of perceived benefits, legitimacy and harvester 
involvement, in influencing internal incentives to comply (Kahler and Gore 2012). 
Such variables have important roles in defining policy-practice gaps, and therefore in 
predicting the rules-in-use. Gathering an understanding about how aquarium fishers 
perceive the de-jure rules which govern their livelihood, and the existing rules-in-use 
would enable researchers and management authorities to implement management 
schemes which reflect the realities of the fishers (cf. Ostrom 2009; Carmenta et al. 
2013). Successful governance of aquarium fisheries requires rules which evolve 
simultaneously with conditions within harvester communities as well as the 
ecological components of coral reefs, however to date, little research has 
investigated the realities of fishers for the aquarium trade (Dietz et al. 2003). This 
research is essential.  
The Philippines is one the largest global exporters of aquarium fish and among the 
first users of cyanide fishing. There is concern over poor monitoring of the trade, high 
export numbers, and the prevalence of damaging collection practices due to non-
compliance among aquarium fishers (Rhyne et al. 2012). The lack of appropriate 
regulations and compliance within the aquarium trade highlights the fact that fishery 
management needs improvement (Wood 2001; Pomeroy et al. 2010; Dee et al. 
2014). This study in the Philippines will use the above concerns over the aquarium 
trade to explore the realities of an aquarium fishery and its management on-the-
ground. My research will use structured analysis to draw comparisons between the 
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de-jure rules and de-facto practices in a Philippine aquarium fishery (see Crawford 
and Ostrom 1995; Basurto et al. 2009). In doing so, the differences between de-jure 
rules and on-the-ground management for an aquarium fishery will be identified (see 
Carmenta et al. 2013). This will encompass the compliance of aquarium fishers, such 
as the prevalence of destructive fishing techniques. Additionally, the influence of 
perceptions on fisher compliance will be investigated, particularly the existence of 
benefits and legitimacy in de-jure rules (see Stern 2008). With research focused at 
the harvester level, the realities of aquarium fishing can be explored. Through 
participant observation, focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews, 
aquarium fishery management will be investigated from the perspectives of 
aquarium fishers and government officials. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Field site  
Calatagan is a municipality within the province of Batangas, in the northern 
Philippine island of Luzon. Situated on the south-western coastline of Luzon, and a 
part of the biodiverse marine ‘Verde Island Passage’ (Figure 3), Calatagan is 
surrounded by mangrove forests and live coral reefs, offering primary fishing 
livelihoods for over 1000 residents (Forbes 2016). Among these resident fishers, 36 
men collect marine reef fish and 13 women collect invertebrates for the aquarium 
trade. Additionally, being positioned just 125 km from the capital city, Manila, and 
linked by main roads, Calatagan is well connected to global trading networks, 
including several exporters for the aquarium trade (Forbes 2016). Also, prior to the 
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study, several aquarium fishers in Calatagan had expressed an interest in changes to 
how the aquarium fishery was being managed.  
Aquarium fishing is governed by the same laws as other municipal fishing activities; 
fishing using boats less than 3 gross tonnes in size and within 15km from the 
shoreline. Legal responsibility for aquarium fishery management falls the local 
government of Calatagan. This is because, responsibility of managing municipal 
waters has been decentralised since 1991. A decentralised government offered an 
interesting opportunity to study local management of an aquarium fishery. This 
made Calatagan an ideal site to begin investigating the origins of species collected for 
the aquarium trade. 
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Figure 3: A map of the Philippines, showing the location of Calatagan, within the province of 
Batangas.  
Maps available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calatagan, Batangas   
 
Data were gathered over three months between May and August 2017, coinciding 
with the peak season for collecting aquarium fish and the change from dry to wet 
season. Our research was based within two sites in the municipality of Calatagan. 
Calatagan has a total of 25 barangay (towns) and the aquarium fisher communities 
reside in two different barangay in Calatagan: Santa Ana and Poblacian Uno. 19 
fishers and 12 invertebrate collectors work from Sta. Ana, with 17 fishers and 1 
TO MANILA 
VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE 
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invertebrate collector from Pob. Uno. All the aquarium fishers in Calatagan were 
male, aged between 27 and 75, while all invertebrate collectors were women, most 
of whom were married to the fishers. Local aquarium fishers and invertebrate 
collectors also work as local middlemen/women (byahero); this consists of 8 women 
and 7 men in Calatagan.  
The fieldwork was carried out in coordination with a Filipino Non-Government 
Organisation (NGO), ‘Community Centred Conservation’ (C3). They made initial 
contact with the local government, obtained the necessary research permits, and 
met the local aquarium fishing communities for primary introductions. C3 organised 
the logistics for fieldwork and provided a local interpreter for Tagalog-English 
translations.  
3.2. Qualitative methods 
The research involved a mixed-methods approach, with a combination of qualitative 
techniques drawn from ethnography, as well as highly structured qualitative 
instruments, summarised in Table 2. This included reviews of Philippine policies to 
analyse the de-jure rules that govern aquarium fishing at different scales. It then 
drew on diverse field-based methods to understand the de-facto practices among 
aquarium fishers in Calatagan and local perceptions towards fishery management. 
Including, complementary ethnographic methods: focus group discussions, semi-
structured interviews and participant observations (Table 2). Afterwards, the findings 
about aquarium fishery management are linked back to Ostrom’s eight principles for 
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effective resource management, to examine if these principles are supported in 
Calatagan.  
This was embedded within an ethnographic research approach, adopting a scientific, 
holistic approach to studying socio-cultural context of aquarium fishing (Schensul et 
al. 1999). Ethnographic research methods gather extremely in-depth qualitative data, 
allowing high contextual validity (Myers 1999; Newing 2011; Hautzinger 2012). The 
researcher becomes immersed in community life, and hence learns first-hand about 
the lives of respondents in their natural environment. This enables the researcher to 
capture experiences in seldom studied topics, thus increasing their understanding 
from the respondent’s perspective (Osborne and Fogel 2009; Sifaneck and Neaigus 
2009; Newing 2011). Ethnography has previously been used to understand 
perceptions, for instance in exploring motivations for non-compliance (Hatcher et al. 
2000; Robbins et al. 2009; Sifaneck and Neaigus. 2009; Carmenta et al. 2013). 
Nevertheless, ethnographic research methods do have their drawbacks. For instance, 
social desirability and researcher bias can decrease validity (Hautzinger 2012). To 
combat this, combining various ethnographic methods in a mixed-method approach 
and including more structured approaches can corroborate and triangulate findings, 






Table 2: A matrix linking research questions to methods and respondent groups. 
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3.2.1. Policy reviews 
Analysis of four policy documents was conducted: the national ‘Fisheries Code RA 
8550’, the ‘Amended Code RA 10654’, the Wildlife Resources and Conservation Act 
Order No. 233’, and the local government’s ‘Calatagan Fisheries Ordinance’. The 
national policies were available online and the Calatagan Fisheries Ordinance was 
obtained from the local government. National de-jure rules applicable to municipal 
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fishers, such as aquarium fishers, were cross referenced with the Calatagan Fisheries 
Ordinance to determine if de-jure rules were also stated in local policies and to 
identify any additional local de-jure rules. A total of 16 rules applicable to aquarium 
fishers were discovered from both national and local policies. These policy 
documents were analysed using a grammatical syntax, ADICO, developed by 
Crawford and Ostrom (1995) (Basurto et al. 2009). ADICO represents five 
subcomponents which define a rule; the (A) attribute (e.g. who the rule is for), (d) 
deontic (e.g. ‘must’/’must not’), (I) aim (e.g. what the rule requires or prohibits), (C) 
condition (e.g. when/where the rule applies) and (O) or else (e.g. the penalty) 
(Crawford and Ostrom 1995; Basurto et al. 2009). The ADICO syntax was used to 
identify de-jure rules in the policy documents which could apply to aquarium fishers, 
what they require aquarium fishers to do or not do, and the conditions under which 
these rules apply, along with the penalties they demand if broken.    
These identified de-jure rules were used as a baseline for comparison to de-facto 
practices, through focus group discussions, interviews and participant observations. 
Further analysis determined which of the rules are currently being implemented on-
the-ground (Carmenta et al. 2013). Rules were coded as 0, 1 or 2 depending on their 
degree of implementation. If a rule was not implemented at all, it was coded “0”, if a 
rule was fully implemented for aquarium fishing, it was coded “2”. Lastly, for a rule 
which was implemented, but not for aquarium fishing, it was coded “1” (see 
Carmenta et al. 2013). For all rules coded as “2” (fully implemented), the level of de-
facto enforcement was also coded as “0” (absent) or “1” (present), using both 
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government and fisher reports. It was also noted whether sanctions were graduated 
for each rule, such as higher sanctions for multiple offences.  
3.2.2. Participant observation 
Living close to the two community sites and constant contact throughout fieldwork, 
allowed observation of the aquarium fisher’s everyday lives and fishing activities. 
Therefore, the realities of aquarium fishing, such as who the fishers are, fishing 
schedules and common fishing techniques could be learnt (Fabinyi 2010). 
Additionally, the market chain for the aquarium trade could be constructed by 
observing what happens to the fish after harvest, and during informal visits to two 
exporters in Manila. In our time spent with the communities, we could familiarise 
ourselves with the fishers and build rapport among them (Whitehead 2005). Here, 
the realities of aquarium fishing could be observed in a passive way, for example the 
social norms in fishery management and common problems faced, while also 
allowing for informal discussions to collect additional information not gained through 
focus group discussions and interviews (Power 2009; Carmenta et al. 2013). For 
instance, local enforcers (coastguard and bantay dagat) could be informally spoken 
with. Notes were made throughout observations, to be written up in a narrative 
format at the end of day. All fieldwork was carried out together with an interpreter; 
a staff member from local NGO, C3. All the following methods were completed in the 
local language ‘Tagalog’, with translations given throughout. 
3.2.3. Focus group discussions 
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Three focus group discussions (FGDs) were carried out with 17 aquarium fishers. 
FGDs took place in a public area, such as a community hall, which respondents were 
familiar with. FGDs were 2 hours long, and conducted with two groups of six Sta. Ana 
fishers, and one with a group of five Pob. Uno fishers. More FGDs were conducted 
with aquarium fishers from Sta. Ana because it was discovered that these fishers 
collect across more areas than aquarium fishers from Pob. Uno, while fishers from 
Pob. Uno stay in one small areas and collect aquarium fish less regularly. Thus, those 
from Sta. Ana will encounter a wider variety of rules and experiences with 
enforcement. Therefore, a second FGD was done with Sta. Ana to allow for 
saturation of findings. The FGDs were conducted after 3 weeks of being in the field 
and carrying out participant observation, to allow for familiarity to form between 
respondents and researchers. Aquarium fishers were approached directly and asked 
if they would be willing to take part in an FGD, with a briefing about this method and 
what participation would involve. Respondents selected for the FGDs varied across 
age groups to represent a range of aquarium fishers. FGDs were homogenous in 
terms of sex and livelihoods; all were men and aquarium fishers. Sampling for FGDs 
was purposive, as not all fishers was approached, as well as for convenience in terms 
of who was available. 
Focus group discussions allowed for participatory techniques, such as policy 
discussions and group activities, during which rich qualitative data could be gathered 
(Hautzinger 2012; Carmenta et al. 2013). FGDs provided a group setting where the 
researcher could observe opinions forming, being built on, or contested (Hampshire 
et al. 2004). The researcher used the policy discussions to fill in a structured table. 
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This table was followed a similar structure to the policy analysis table, to allow 
comparison of de-jure and de-facto rules (see Appendix 1). For instance, there were 
separate columns to address rule implementation, de-facto conditions, and sanctions 
in Calatagan. Other useful information was also noted down during the FGDs, such as 
common problems the fishers face and unwritten rules (licit or illicit) governing the 
aquarium fishery. The FGDs were closed with a short activity to gauge an 
understanding of the aquarium fisher’s perceptions about the implemented de-jure 
rules. Fishers were asked to freely place cue cards symbolising the different rules, on 
to a 1-5 scale from ‘I would least like to see this continue’ (1) to ‘I would most like to 
see this continue’ (5). Care was taken to involve all respondents and discuss the 
group’s decisions, for instance any benefits or limitations of the rules (See Chapter 
6). During the FGDs, a Sony IC audio recorder was used. This was listened to after 
each FGD to clarify and develop on existing notes. The audio recordings were 
listened to with the help of our Tagalog interpreter. 
3.2.4. Semi-structured interviews 
Two semi-structured interview schedules were conducted with the aquarium fishers 
from both Sta. Ana and Pob. Uno. Interview question topics were established in 
advance, and open-ended questions were effective for further exploration of 
answers (Hampshire et al 2004; Osborne and Fogel 2009) (see Appendix 2). In all 
cases, respondents were asked face-to-face if they would be willing to take part in 
the study, with briefings beforehand about what the interviews involved. Interviews 
took place on either a secluded area beach where aquarium fishers would gather or 
at the respondent’s home.  
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3.2.4.1. First interview 
The first interview was 15 minutes long and contained semi-structured questions 
about fishing techniques, awareness of rules, enforcement consistency, and direct 
questions about compliance (see Kahler and Gore 2012). Answers were recorded 
during the interview, after translation by the interpreter. 35 out of 36 aquarium 
fishers in Calatagan were interviewed, minus one fisher who was hard of hearing, 
therefore providing an almost 100% saturation sample (Sta. Ana: n=19, Pob. Uno: 
n=16). Interviews were ended with a specialised method for indirectly asking about 
compliance, called the Bean Method, for comparison against the direct questioning 
technique (see 3.2.5).  
3.2.4.2. Second interview 
The second interview schedule was 30 minutes long and used purposive sampling; it 
was conducted with 26 key informants. This included women involved in the 
aquarium trade as invertebrate collectors and middlewomen (byahero) (n=9), 
aquarium fishers from Sta. Ana (n=10), and from Pob. Uno (n=7). The aquarium 
fishers in this second interview had all participated in the first interview as well. A 
saturation sample was not used here, as thematic analysis was being used so 
saturation could be achieved after a small subset of interviews. Key informants were 
chosen as they appeared knowledgeable about fishery management. Interviews 
were stopped within each of the three groups (Sta. Ana, Pob. Uno and invertebrate 
collectors), when the data gathered became repetitive, and little or no new 
information was discovered. 
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The women were included as respondents in this interview, because their frequent 
involvement in the aquarium trade had been observed. The women were not 
selected for the focus group discussions or first interview schedules because they 
had low awareness of specific rules and enforcement, due to not fishing in the sea. 
Yet, they were aware of general aspects of fishery management and threats faced by 
the aquarium fishery. The women’s perceptions, therefore, proved valuable for key 
informant interviews.  
The key informant interviews used semi-structured questions which could explore in-
depth about perceived trust and fairness in aquarium fishery management, fisher 
and government involvement, and benefits/limitations for future fishery use (see 
Myers 1999; Stern 2008; Osborne and Fogel 2009; Kahler and Gore 2012). Three 5-
point likert scales were also included for structured ratings, before being explored 
more with open-ended questions (see Stern 2008; Kahler and Gore 2012). They were 
used to measure opinions of ‘likely future use of the fishery for the next 10 years’, 
‘fisher involvement in fishery management’, and ‘local government involvement in 
fishery management’. Due to their qualitative nature, each key informant interview 
was audio recorded, and used to validate interview transcripts, with the interpreters 
help.  
3.2.4.3. Government interviews 
Data were also gathered from five government officials using 30-minute, semi-
structured interviews. This included respondents from local government: the head of 
the Municipal Agriculture Office (MAO), the Environmental Chair in the local council 
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(Sangguniang Bayan), and the barangay chairmen of the Sta. Ana and Pob. Uno. It 
also included a local representative of the national government agency: the director 
of the Provincial Fisheries Office (PFO), under BFAR. There were two interviews 
schedules conducted with different government officials; time constraints did not 
allow for both schedules to be done with each respondent. The interviews with MAO 
and the director of PFO followed a similar structure to the table completed in FGDs 
(see Appendix 3), to understand de-facto rules and enforcement from the 
government’s point of view, as these members of government are responsible for 
implementing policy rules. With the Environmental Chair in local government, and 
the two barangay chairmen, the interview schedule was similar to key informant 
interviews with fisher respondents. Thus, these interviews used more open-ended 
questions, exploring perceptions of fishery management. Interviews were conducted 
with government officials in the aim of triangulating data gathered from fishing 
communities, and to understand aquarium fishery management from the 
government’s perspective (see McClanahan et al. 2004). Additional informal 
discussions with two different barangay chairmen opposed to aquarium fishing, and 
two national BFAR staff in Manila were also conducted at the end of study for 
clarification of the findings. 
3.2.5. The Bean Method 
The Bean Method is a simple and easily understood technique, which ensures 
anonymity by pooling several respondent’s answers together (Lau et al. 2011; Nuno 
and John 2015). It is designed with aim of asking sensitive questions in an indirect, 
less intrusive way. Therefore, the Bean Method is predicted to gain more accurate 
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estimates of non-compliance than direct questioning (Nuno and John 2015). It works 
by having two jars, one small and one large, with a known quantity of assorted 
coloured ‘beans’ and black ‘beans’ (Lau et al. 2011; Nuno and John 2015). In this 
Bean Method there were 20 black, 15 yellow, 15 blue, and 15 white dice in the small 
jar, and 40 black, 25 yellow, 25 blue, and 25 white dice in the large jar. When 
respondents were asked a yes or no question about whether they are not following a 
rule, if they wished to answer “yes”, they would move a set coloured dice from the 
small jar to the large, or for “no”, they would move a black dice from the small jar to 
the large. Respondents were given privacy to move the dice so no actions were 
observed. Two to three of the same questions were asked for direct questioning and 
the ‘Bean Method’. These were: ‘Do you currently use cyanide to collect aquarium 
fish?’ with yellow dice, ‘Do you currently use compressors to collect aquarium fish’ 
with white dice, and for Sta. Ana fishers, who fished in areas with a Marine Protected 
Area, ‘Do you currently enter the MPA to collect aquarium fish?’ with blue dice. After 
each week of interviews, the dice were recounted to determine how many of each 
colour had been moved, and therefore, how many fishers within each community 
admitted to non-compliance. The Bean Method was used to estimate compliance for 
these three rules, because they were recognised as sensitive topics to discuss, 
whereas the fishers would openly share about the other rules and compliance could 
be easily observed, such as registrations and species restrictions. 
3.3. Data analysis 
FGD tables and interview notes were inputted onto a computer following the 
discussion or interview. The focus group discussions and key informant interviews 
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were audio recorded, via a Sony IC Recorder, with verbal consent from respondents. 
These were later used to validate notes, and listened to by one researcher and 
interpreter. Due to the qualitative nature of the data, mainly descriptive statistics 
and narratives are used for presentation (Carmenta et al. 2013).  
FGD discussions and interview notes were integrated, and subjected to thematic 
coding by hand, by one researcher (see Hampshire et al 2004; Tong 2007; Stern 
2008). The codes were applied consistently across all research methods throughout 
analysis and entered in a spreadsheet. Notes from observations and informal 
discussions were also coded by hand. This provided additional qualitative data, and 
were invaluable for describing the daily activities which occur in aquarium fishing and 
trade (Fabinyi 2010). 
In the parts of the FGDs and first fisher interviews, there were more structured 
questions. In the focus group discussions, and two government interviews, 
structured tables were completed (see Appendix 1 and 3). These five tables were 
combined, and then used as a comparison to the policy review table. Using the first 
fisher interviews, percentage awareness and consistency of enforcement for each 
implemented de-jure rule could be calculated (Kahler and Gore. 2012). In the first 
fisher interviews, non-compliance estimates were gathered from both direct 
questioning and the Bean Method. The proportion of non-compliance from both 
methods are presented in this study to show comparisons of their effectivity (Lau et 
al. 2011; Nuno and John. 2014).  
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Likert scales in key informant interviews and the focus group activity were analysed 
by calculating average scores (1-5) (Kahler and Gore. 2012). The average results from 
the focus group activity are presented along a 20cm line, where 5cm represent each 
point along the likert scale. A total of 6 rules are placed along this line, signifying 
fisher preferences on how much they would like to see the rules persist in the future.  
3.4. Ethics 
Research was approved by the Lancaster University Ethics Board. Human-based 
research must follow ethical guidelines to prevent distress and negative 
consequences among respondents.  
This study had ethical issues in its sensitivity of certain questions. For example, 
questions about non-compliance, which may unsettle respondents and divulging this 
information could put them at risk. Therefore, a specialised method was used to ask 
about non-compliance: the Bean Method is designed for complete anonymity and 
privacy. The identity of the fishers was protected throughout the study as all data 
was anonymised. Place names were included in this study, such as ‘Calatagan’, and 
the areas where the communities reside for context. For further protection of the 
fishers, the findings from each area were grouped together.  
To reduce feelings of distress, the fishers were briefed before each method and 
informed that they had the right to refuse any answers, and could stop the interview 
or focus group discussion at any time. Additionally, oral consent was gained before 
each focus group discussion and interview, as well as consent for an audio recorder 
to be used. Audio recordings were deleted after they had been replayed, and this 
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was kept solely between the researcher and the interpreter. Conducting the 
methods in the respondents’ everyday environment, for example at home or in 
communal areas, increased comfort and openness. Therefore, the ethical protocol 
used was effective at protecting the respondents in the study. 
3.5. Researcher reflexivity and positionality 
Qualitative research, such as participant observations, focus group discussions and 
semi-structured interviews, require a degree interpretation by the researcher. These 
ethnographic methods, particularly when conducted among different cultures, are 
receptable to bias and misinterpretation (Clancy 2013).  
For added credibility and depth during the research process, reflexivity is an 
important characteristic. During interactions with the aquarium fishers, I was 
reflexive in asking open-ended questions and using the relevant prompts. This 
allowed further exploration and clarity of perceptions and personal experiences 
(England 1994; Bradshaw and Stratford 2010). Reflexivity was also valuable when 
coding transcripts and narratives, as I had gained an in-depth understanding of 
contexts, and thus was able to reflect on this information during analysis (Clancy. 
2013).  
As the researcher, I was conscious of my positionality, particularly the effect my 
presence would have on the fisher’s behaviour (England 1994). In this case, cultural, 
gender and age differences, could have influenced behaviours and the information 
shared. For researchers to integrate within the community, time was allowed at the 
beginning of fieldwork for various introductions and acclimatisation before beginning 
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any face-to-face methods. Coordinating with a local NGO would have helped with 
familiarities. The community were already well acclimatised and welcoming to 
members of the NGO from their previous visits. Therefore, introductions to 
community initiated by the NGO were extremely useful in reducing negative feelings. 
By working with a Filipino interpreter throughout fieldwork, the researchers gained 
cultural awareness and behaved and dressed respectfully within the community. 
Minimising the language gap, for instance in translations and learning important 
Tagalog words, aided in clarity and approachability. 
Reflexivity and positionality were drawn upon throughout research in the field and 
data analysis, providing an insightful account of the practices in aquarium fishing, 
and perceptions shared by respondents.  
4. Results: From the Reef  
This chapter presents narratives gathered from participant observations and informal 
discussions to describe, first-hand, the day to day activities of Calatagan aquarium 
fishers (Box 1), and the journey which fish will take before being shipped to 
customers worldwide (Figure 5). This is important for providing context on the 
aquarium fishing livelihood in Calatagan. By doing so, the following information will 
lay the ground for further exploration of de-jure rules and de-facto practices in 
aquarium fishery management. 
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4.1. The aquarium fishers 
The aquarium trade began in the Philippines in the 1950’s, specifically between 1954 
and 1955 in Calatagan. It was introduced by an intermediary (locally named 
‘byahero’) and an exporter from Manila. The oldest aquarium fishers in Calatagan 
have been collecting aquarium fish for over 50 years, and learnt how to do so from 
their fathers and uncles, skills which they have passed down to their own sons and 
nephews. Fishers, invertebrate collectors and byahero in Calatagan hold many family 
ties and “look after eachother”, even sharing their income with a fellow fisher who 
has been unable to work for some time, or someone who needs new equipment. 
Families of an aquarium fishing community, live close to one other and the 
community gathers together to work, share out income, and discuss fishing 
schedules. The two aquarium fishing communities in Calatagan: Sta. Ana and Pob. 
Uno, will rarely interact with one another. Their fishing practices are described 
below.  
4.1.1. Santa Ana 
Barangay Sta. Ana is home to the majority of those involved in the aquarium trade in 
Calatagan; 19 aquarium fishers and 12 invertebrate collectors (Figure 5). Sta. Ana 
fishers will fish in groups of three to four men, sharing small motorised boats as not 
all fishers have their own due to the expenses, including an annual registration fee of 
300 pesos (~£5.00) for each motorised boat. Aquarium fishers in Sta Ana gather on 
the same main beach to store and package their collected fish. Unfortunately, 
aquarium fishers “may lose the packing area because of tourist development”, as this 
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beach neighbours two tourist beach resorts. However, the resorts do provide an 
alternative livelihood for aquarium fishers who work as tourist boatmen during the 
months of January to June when the tourist season is at its peak. On an average 
fishing day, the aquarium fishers will leave from the Sta. Ana beach between 7 and 8 
am and return at 2 pm, giving 6-7 hours of fishing per day. This may however vary, 
when adverse weather prevents suitable fishing conditions. Local women, usually the 
wives of the fishers, go to the beach at low tide to collect invertebrates for the 
aquarium trade, such as snails, crabs and sea stars.  
The peak season for collecting aquarium fish is between March and July when the 
weather is calm, and before the start of wet season in mid-July. Wet season also 
coincides with the North-West monsoon from July to September. When the winds 
and waves become too strong, Sta. Ana fishers will move their collection areas to a 
secluded bay in Calatagan, Papagas Bay, and will continue to collect here until 
October. Two Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are located within Papagas Bay, which 
are designed to aid fish reproduction, the establishment of a giant clam population, 
and to attract tourists (Figure 4). Additionally, Papagas bay is home to a strip of 
private resorts, and two additional barangay which are specifically closed to 
aquarium fishing, so there are a number of restricted areas for aquarium fishers 
(Figure 4). For the remainder of the year, aquarium fishing can take place all along 
the more exposed side of Calatagan, which is closer to where the community resides 



















Figure 4: A map of the coastline around Calatagan, obtained from a local government 
document. 
The locations of the two communities (Santa Ana and Poblacian Uno) are indicated with 
black circles, and the two MPA’s (Santa Ana and Tanagan) with yellow circles. (On the map 
Poblacian Uno is labelled with its alternative name ‘Barangay 1’) The restricted coastlines, for 
private resorts and closed barangay, are shown with red lines. For fishing in mid-July to 
October: Papagas bay, as labelled on the map. For fishing in October to July: the exposed, 
western coastline is used. 
Ten aquarium fishers, originally from Sta Ana, are now registered in another 
municipality, and regularly travel there instead to collect aquarium fish. Registering 
means that all fishers, food and aquarium alike, must register themselves with the 
local government, in the municipality where they work and reside. For instance, the 
fishers in Calatagan would register themselves here, and those in other 
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municipalities would do the same there. This also means that all fishers are only 
legally allowed to fish in the municipality where they are registered, and must not 
fish elsewhere. The municipality where several aquarium fishers have relocated to 
provides “more fish, and fewer tourists, food fishers and fish pens”. As well as a 
greater abundance of aquarium fish there are more valuable species, for example, 
the Blue Tang (Paracanthurus hepatus), Firefish (Nemateleotris magnifica) and 
Emperor Angelfish (Pomacanthus imperator). Following a fishing trip, these fishers 
will return to Sta. Ana to transport and sell their catch to the local byahero 
(intermediaries) who have family ties and an established rapport with the fishers. 
Seven invertebrate collectors, as well as four of the aquarium fishers, also act as the 
byahero to small groups of around four fishers each (Figure 5). They are responsible 
for transporting the aquarium fish and invertebrates to exporters in Manila and for 
sharing the payments received from exporters among their group of fishers (Box 1). 
4.1.2. Poblacian Uno 
The community of aquarium fishers in Pob. Uno is smaller than the one in Sta. Ana 
with only 17 active fishers. Many aquarium fishers in Pob. Uno are now elderly or 
have stopped aquarium fishing due to available alternative livelihoods, such as 
seaweed farming. Fishers remaining in Pob. Uno collect aquarium fish in one small 
area year-round, staying close to the barangay’s shoreline rather than travelling to 
other areas in Calatagan. Unlike the Sta. Ana fishers, fishers from Pob. Uno only have 
individual non-motorised paddle boats. The expenses are lower for these boats with 
a registration fee of 100 pesos (~£1.60). The fishers work independently and spend 
less time fishing compared to the Sta. Ana fishers; spending 3-4 hours fishing per day. 
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Catch sizes are smaller in Pob. Uno compared to than those of Sta. Ana, which also 
means that there are also fewer people working as byahero in this community. Three 
aquarium fishers tend to transport fish to Manila, and there is only one woman in 
Pob. Uno involved in the aquarium trade as both an invertebrate collector and 














Figure 5: A Market Chain portraying the actors within the aquarium trade. 
With straight arrows showing the journey aquarium fish will take from the harvesters to 
consumers, while dashed arrows symbolise the orders passing from the consumers to 
harvesters. The numbers in brackets represent how many people in each group exist for 
Calatagan’s aquarium trade. 
4.2. The fish’s journey 
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The aquarium fishers of Calatagan have developed specialised collection techniques 
to maximise their fishing and demonstrate great amounts of skills and patience while 
working (Figure 6). They use similar collection techniques, for example, all fishers use 
the same design for short, paddle-like fins made from PVC for free-diving (Figure 6d). 
Small schooling species such as Chromis are commonly caught using a large fine 
mesh net called a saplad (Figure 6c). While fast-moving species, for instance Moorish 
Idols (Zanclus cornutus), are collected using a combination of a scoop net (sigpaw) 















Figure 6: a-f show pictures of the various equipment used by aquarium fishers. 
In order: a) is the sigpaw or scoop net, b) is the lambat or barrier net, these two are used 
together for fishing and the scoop net is also used for handling fish. c) is the saplad net used 
for collecting small, schooling species, d) are the paddle-like fins used by aquarium fish 
collectors. e) is the floating container carried along by fishers during fishing, and f) are the 
large nets used to store collected fish in until packaging days.  






From interviews with the fishers, it was learnt that in the past cyanide fishing was 
used to target species of Angelfish (Pomacanthidae) and Triggerfish (Balistidae) as 
they are fast-moving species and difficult to catch. Compressor tanks would also 
have been used to collect species found in deeper waters, such as Blue Tang 
(Paracanthurus hepatus), Clown Triggerfish (Balistoides conspicillum), and Angelfish 
(Pomacanthidae) species’ (for current occurrences see Chapter 5). Compressor diving 
is used by fishers to reach fish in deeper waters. However, this is unsafe for fishers as 
the tanks remain on the surface and the equipment, including breathing tubes, tend 
to be dirty. Therefore “compressors are bad for fisher health”, as they can lead to 
breathing problems in the future and risks of decompression sickness. As 
compressors also allow access to deeper waters, fish are easier to exploit, including 
“small, juvenile fish”. Therefore, the use of compressor tanks is detrimental to both 
human and environmental health. 
Once the fish are collected they are transferred to floating containers on the surface 
which the fishers pull behind them while swimming and freediving. The containers 
have separate compartments to allow fish to be grouped according to their 
behaviours (e.g. aggressive fish kept separately) (Figure 6e). They only collect what is 
ordered by the exporters, and aquarium fishers “return extra or unwanted fish to the 
reef” immediately. At the end of each fishing day, the catch is transferred into large 
barrel-like nets (Figure 6f). This negates the requirement for water changes or 
feeding as the seawater flows through the nets and algae provides food for the fish. 
These nets are kept tied to posts offshore, adjacent to the beach, and contain all the 
days’ catches until the fish are packaged for transportation to Manila by the byahero. 
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4.2.2. To the exporters 
Usually after four to six days of fishing, two or three of the byahero will transport the 
fish and invertebrates to exporters in Manila by road (Box 1, Figure 5). For three 
hours in the afternoon, the fishers and their families transfer fish from the offshore 
nets to the shore, placing them into large, transparent, plastic bags which are filled 
with approximately 1/3 seawater and 2/3 of oxygen from large compressor tanks.  
Box 1: The fishing schedule taken by aquarium fisher communities in Calatagan. 
Throughout holding and packaging, fish are kept in groups depending on their 
species and behaviour. For example, small communal species of Chromis and 
Anemonefish (Amphiprioninae) are grouped together, while Emperor Angelfish 
(Pomacanthus imperator) are kept alone. On an average packing day, 150 bags were 
counted, containing assorted species and numbers of individual fish. Each fisher’s 
bag is labelled with their initials, and the byahero keeps a record of the quantity and 
species that the group of fishers have delivered. Bags of fish are then loaded into 
vans (jeepneys) which have boards placed on the floor to prevent the bags from 
heating up. (Figure 7).  
Fishing Schedule 
1. 4-6 days of fishing (until sufficient amount collected) 
2. Package fish, and byahero transport them to Manila 
3. Byahero at the exporters – fish are screened and payments given. New orders 
may be passed on here. (Rest day for fishers.) 
4. Sharing of income and new orders. 
5. Fishers return to collecting fish (Orders can also be passed on from exporters 











Figure 7: Packed bags of aquarium fish and invertebrates ready to be moved onto the 
jeepney. 
Photo credit: R. Turley (author) 
In Sta. Ana and Pob. Uno, although the two communities operate independently 
from each other, within each community they will “work together to package and 
transport fish. Aquarium fishers within the community will compromise on which day 
to transport the fish”, depending on whether some fishers need more time to collect 
enough to meet exporter demands, and achieve their necessary income. For 
instance, adverse weather conditions in the wet season makes fishing more difficult 
so it is common for additional collection days to be required. During informal 
discussions with the fishers, it was reported that there was high mortality among a 
week’s catch of fish during a period of extreme hot weather, and several fishers 
required extra days to catch more fish hence pushing back the transport date. Before 
leaving for Manila, the byahero’ must visit the local government to collect the 
necessary paperwork and pay for auxiliary invoices. Auxiliary invoices are the 
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necessary paperwork and expenses for everyone transporting fish, stating the 
number of bags, without which it would not be possible to reach Manila.  
It is estimated that it takes six hours from the start of packaging to when the fish 
leave Calatagan. During the five hour journey to Manila, “[the fish] pass through 
three security checkpoints where the auxiliary invoice, and only occasionally the 
bags, are checked by police. If everything is in order the fish can continue. However, 
byahero shared that in the past, the police have raised issues with the paperwork 
and the byahero were “stopped to ask for money before letting [them] pass”. This 
now occurs less often due to new administrations in national government. The more 
time that is spent at these checkpoints, the greater the risk of repercussions on fish 
survival rates, yet the researchers were told that most do survive the journey.  
Upon arriving in Manila, byahero will visit their specific exporters (Figure 5). Each 
byahero will sell to a different exporter in Manila, whom they have chosen based on 
prices, screening procedures and a good working relationship. During visits to 
exporter facilities in Manila, it was learnt that they screen the fish on arrival and will 
reject any fish with damage to the fins or body, or those below the minimum size 
limit. We enquired about any cyanide testing that might occur at this stage. The two 
exporters, shared that cyanide testing is less frequent now than when cyanide bans 
were first introduced, as traces dissipate from the fish within three days so the 
process proved to have little success. One exporter explained that they are however 
familiar with the behaviour exhibited by cyanide-caught fish, and so will challenge 
the byahero of said fish.  It is still not clear exactly what happens to the rejected fish; 
one exporter reported that they are returned to the sea, though this was not 
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observed and survival rates would be questionable due to the distance to habitable 
reefs. It is possible that rejected fish may be sold to underground (illegal) trader 
markets, or to exporters with lower quality standards.  
During informal discussions with directors at the exporters, we were told that after 
fish are screened, the byahero are paid in cash, and given a receipt for the fish and 
invertebrates that have passed the screening process. In some cases, the exporters 
will give cash advances to the fishers via byahero, to cover the cost of their 
equipment or fishing expenses. After being screened and approved by the exporter, 
the fish are quarantined at the exporter facility. Through observations, the 
quarantine process varies between exporters; some have multiple stages and move 
fish into a main holding area after a few hours, while some keep fish in quarantine 
until being shipped. For shipping to the importers, the fish are packaged using a mix 
of 40% water and 60% oxygen to increase survival. The main countries which import 
aquarium fish from Manila include; the US, UK, Germany and China (Figure 5). To 
obtain the variety of species ordered by the importers, exporters receive fish from 
aquarium fishing communities throughout the Philippines; from northern Luzon, to 
Cebu, and even the very south in Mindanao. However, it became apparent during 
interviews with exporters that while there are currently many communities of 
aquarium fishers across the Philippines, local governments have begun to prohibit 
aquarium fishing in certain municipalities because of the negative connotations the 
industry has in relation to sustainability and use of destructive fishing techniques. 
Aquarium fishing can vary between different communities’ due to the role local 
government units will play (see Chapter 5). For example, fisher accounts shared that 
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the incidence of illegal techniques may be higher in some areas than others, or 
government support towards fishers can also differ.  
Aquarium fishing in the Philippines is driven by consumer demand. The exporter, as 
an intermediary, passes on orders received from the importers (consumers), to the 
byahero (intermediaries), who then relays the order to the fishers (harvesters) 
(Figure 5). In this case, limits on catch size are more determined by consumer orders 
than government harvest rules. When the byahero return from transporting fish to 
Manila, they meet with their group of fishers to distribute payment to each fisher 
based on their catch (Box 1). Therefore, the aquarium fishers are usually paid for 
their work after the fish have been collected, transported to Manila, and approved 
by the exporter’s screening process. This day is always accompanied by lots of 
celebrations, before the aquarium fish collectors return to work the next day.  
5. Results and Discussion: Policy-Practice Gap 
Aquarium fishing in the Philippines is governed by national and local government 
policies (Wood 2001; Dee et al. 2014) (Table 3). These de-jure rules are designed to 
increase sustainable practices, for example, by prohibiting the use of destructive 
fishing techniques and defining boundaries for the harvest of fishery resources. 
However, as across contexts, gaps often form between policy and practice (see 
Hatcher et al. 2000; Robbins et al. 2009; Carmenta et al. 2013). These gaps can arise 
due to weak governance, when managing authorities fail to fully implement and 
enforce de-jure rules, or when the rules are misaligned to harvester needs (Fabinyi 
and Dalabajan 2010; Pascual et al. 2014). This in turn can result in non-compliance 
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among the fishers; communities simply do not follow the rules, or unwritten rules 
emerge that counteract de-jure rules (Schendel and Abrahams 2005; Phelps 2013). 
The fishery’s rules-in-use define its on-the-ground practices, which often differ from 
de-jure rules stated in legislation. This gap between de-jure rules and de-facto 
practices is termed the policy-practice gap. By exploring how policies are shaped at 
the local level, this study seeks to identify policy-practice gaps for a Philippine 
aquarium fishery. Policy-practice gaps are exacerbated by non-compliance, and 
concern over the persistent use of cyanide in aquarium fishing, could mean that 
policy-practice gaps are widened by non-compliance to de-jure rules banning cyanide 
use (Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010). However, through structured analysis of policies, 
de-jure vs de-facto rule implementation and enforcement, as well as investigating 
fisher awareness and compliance, this study presents an alternative hypothesis. 
Policy-practice gaps form at the government level and are not necessarily widened 
by non-compliance at the harvester level.  
5.1. Government policies 
The process of collecting and trading aquarium fish is governed by a set of policies 
laid out in the National Fisheries Code 1998 (RA 8550), and the amended code in 
2014 (RA 10654). Additionally, the collection of aquatic wildlife, such as marine reef 
fish for the aquarium trade, is controlled by special permits included in the National 
Wildlife Resources and Conservation Act, under the Wildlife Resources Conservation 
and Protection Act of 2001 (Fisheries Administrative Order No. 233). The role of 
managing fishery resources and fishing activities falls to the Bureau of Fishery and 
Aquatic Resources (BFAR), under the National Department of Agriculture (DA) (Figure 
63 
8). However, as the Philippine government became decentralised in 1991, 
management responsibilities are now split amongst different levels; National, 
Regional, Provincial BFAR offices, and Local Government Units (Figure 8). 
Observations and discussions with government officials revealed that regions in the 
Philippines consist of groups of Provinces, such as Batangas, which contain a number 
of Municipalities. The national BFAR Office in Manila controls exporters for the 
aquarium trade, and focuses on regulating commercial fishing activities (boats over 3 
gross tonnes). Regional and provincial BFAR offices are created where necessary to 
localise the management of resources, oversee and provide support to the local 
governments in each municipality (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: The structure of government offices and agencies governing aquarium fishing in the 
Philippines. 
 
Local governments have authority and responsibility over their municipal resources, 
including waters 15 km from the shoreline. Therefore, each municipality has its own 
policies, called ordinances. Government officials shared that municipal ordinances 
are written by the Mayor and Sangunian Bayan (local council) (Figure 8). These 
ordinances implement, and can also amend and add to national policies (Table 3). 
For instance, sanctions within municipalities have a maximum fine of 2500 pesos, 
with exceptions for certain rules. Within each local government there is a Municipal 
Agriculture Office (MAO), some of which also have municipal BFAR staff. MAO 
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manages municipal fishery activities (boats under 3 gross tonnes) by implementing 
and enforcing de-jure rules (Figure 8). Fishing activities within the municipal waters 
of Calatagan are governed by the Calatagan Fisheries Ordinance from 2006, this 
includes collecting aquarium fish. Before government decentralisation, fishers were 
permitted to travel to different municipalities to fish. Now fishers must register their 
boats and themselves in one municipality, while entry of unregistered fishers is 
restricted. In Calatagan, BFAR was observed to be seldom active, and the closest 
active office is the Provincial Fisheries Office (PFO) in Batangas, to which the 
Calatagan Municipal Government reports illegal activities and sends updated the lists 
of registered fishers and boats. Within a municipality there are further groupings of 
‘barangay’, resembling small towns or villages. A barangay will also have elected 
chairmen to represent residents at the LGU, and resolve local issues. Barangay 
Chairmen are more familiar with their local communities, for instance the Pob. Uno 
Chairman was previously an aquarium fisher and byahero himself. Barangay do not 
have their own ordinances, and so enforce rules according to municipal ordinances.    
De-jure rules from national fishery policies have been translated into Calatagan’s 
fisheries ordinance, which was last updated in 2006. Through translation, the 
national de-jure rules are altered to coincide with local conditions, such as defining 
specific closed seasons and restricted breeding/spawning species. 16 de-jure rules 
from national and local policies, which could apply to aquarium fishers, are 
presented below in Table 3. 
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Table 3: National and Local (Calatagan) de-jure rules governing aquarium trade from policy analyses. 
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The previous table shows the various types of rules applicable to municipal fishers, 
which include aquarium fishers. For example, registrations, permits, gear restrictions, 
species restrictions, quotas, spatial and temporal closures. The local fisheries 
ordinance for Calatagan have added a gear restriction banning the possession and 
use of compressor tanks for fishing. This de-jure rule is not in national policies, 
showing that local policies are tailored to suit local conditions. Many specifications of 
the de-jure rules, such as exact closed seasons, catch ceiling limits and the restricted 
juvenile or breeding/spawning species, are not defined in national or local policies, 
merely that this is determined by the Department of Agriculture or Local 
Government (Table 3). These specifications are made as the de-jure rules are 
implemented on-the-ground. Table 3 also shows that one national de-jure rule was 
not stated in the local policy for Calatagan; the requirement of individual fishers to 
have an Aquatic Wildlife Special Use permit for collecting aquarium fish.  
A decentralised government means that local governments can manage local 
resources in a way that is beneficial to them. For instance, as national policies are 
written into local policies, the de-jure rules can be specified to suit local conditions 
(Pomeroy et al. 2010). Localised management may also allow local fishers to have 
greater participation in the management of the resource, and the de-jure rules could 
be better matched to local livelihood needs (Grafton 2000). However, sharing 
management of fishery resources among local governments across the country does 
have its weaknesses (Pomeroy et al. 2010). It can be challenging for the national 
government to monitor the resource management of each specific municipality. For 
instance, discussions with officials in national BFAR revealed that they do not have a 
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compilation of local ordinances. Such limited communication can be a weakness of 
decentralised government (Gonzales and Savaris 2005). Some municipalities could 
lack the resources to effectively implement and enforce de-jure rules, while more 
interactions between managing authorities and local communities could result in 
cases of bribery or corruption (Robbins et al. 2009; Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010; 
Pomeroy et al. 2010). 
5.2. Rules-in-use 
There are often challenges in fully implementing the de-jure rules as rules-in-use. Not 
all the de-jure rules may be implemented by the Municipal Agriculture Office, and 
those which are implemented may be lacking in enforcement. De-facto 
implementation of the 16 de-jure rules for municipal fishers in Calatagan was 
investigated, as well as de-facto enforcement (Table 4). It is seen whether the rule 
specifications for de-jure rules, such as catch ceilings, closed seasons and species 
restrictions, are implemented for the aquarium fishery (Table 4).  
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Table 4: The rules-in-use governing Calatagan’s aquarium fishery, gathered during Focus Group Discussions (n=17) and government interviews 
(n=2). 
Fully implemented rules (2), Rules implemented for other fishing activities, but not for aquarium fishing (1), Rules not implemented at all (0).  
For rules not fully implemented (1/0): N/A for further columns as these rules are not in use for aquarium fishing.  
For fully implemented rules (2): active enforcement (1), or no enforcement (0). Active enforcement refers to rules which are enforced during patrols 
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In accordance with policies, the cyanide and compressor bans are among several de-
jure implemented in practice by Calatagan’s local government. However, policy-
practice gaps begin to emerge as de-jure rules are not implemented specifically for 
aquarium fishers. The results suggest that half of the de-jure rules written in national 
and local policies and applicable to aquarium fishers, are being implemented for the 
aquarium fishery in Calatagan (Table 4). For example, there is no implementation of 
an Aquatic Wildlife Special Collection permit for aquarium fishing. Aquarium fishers 
in Calatagan expressed an interest in obtaining a special collection permit, yet this 
has not been provided by the local government. The permit is issued by the 
Provincial BFAR Fisheries Office (PFO). During an interview with the head of PFO we 
learnt that PFO are under the presumption that Calatagan’s local government have 
prohibited all aquarium fishing and no aquarium fishers reside in this municipality. 
This circumstance highlights issues of miscommunication across government levels. A 
limitation of decentralised government in countries such as the Philippines is 
miscommunication, and local governments may lack the data and enforcement 
capacities for successfully implementing rules (Gonzales and Savaris 2005; Dee et al. 
2014).  
Various de-jure rules are implemented for other municipal fishing activities, but little 
attention has been given to aquarium fishing. Restricted collection of 
breeding/spawning fish, juvenile fish and closed seasons are de-jure rules that are 
currently implemented for food fishery species but not for species in the aquarium 
trade (Table 4). The only locally implemented restrictions for species in the aquarium 
trade is the prohibited collection of corals and endangered species defined under the 
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CITES (Wood 2001; Dee et al. 2014). This lack of implemented rules for aquarium 
fishing reflects gaps forming between policy and practice at the local government 
level. 
Additional gaps between policy and practice are seen in Calatagan’s two Marine 
Protected Areas (MPAs). The MPA in Tanagan covers most of this barangay’s 
coastline, and has existed since the 1900’s, however its guardhouse and buoys were 
destroyed in a typhoon many years ago and new ones have been requested for the 
last three to four years (Table 4). The missing guardhouses and buoys, illustrate that 
MPA enforcement may be ineffective at deterring entry, and therefore needs 
strengthening to achieve its desired purpose. De-jure rules need to be effectively 
enforced as well as implemented to integrate them as rules-in-use for the fishery 
(Keane et al. 2008).  
It has been found that de-facto enforcement in Calatagan differs slightly to what is 
defined in national and local policies (Table 4). In practice, the sanctions tend to 
consist of more verbal warnings. The fines, confiscations and imprisonment can only 
be dealt out by the Municipal Agriculture Office, so when rule breakers are caught by 
enforcers in the sea, verbal warnings are often used (Table 4). The findings also show 
that more graduated sanctions exist in practice than are stated in policies. This is 
because verbal warnings are usually given for first offences, before higher sanctions 
are given (Table 4). Graduated sanctions are punishments that increase, with the 
frequency or severity of rule breaking. As such, these types of sanctions are thought 
to be effective at increasing compliance to de-jure rules (Cinner et al. 2012). By 
initially using verbal warnings, rather than taking all rule breakers to MAO, the 
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enforcers of Calatagan would also be saving their time and resources. Other than 
giving appropriate sanctions, consistent enforcement is also important for 
compliance, such as consistently giving sanctions to rule breakers and regular patrols 
to detect non-compliance (Keane et al. 2008).  
5.2.1. Enforcement 
Enforcement is important for reducing policy-practice gaps in management (Keane et 
al. 2008). Strong enforcement would use coercion to create compliance among 
harvesters (Arias 2015). Of the eight de-jure rules implemented for aquarium fishing, 
six are actively enforced by four resident coastguards and 32 volunteer sea 
patrollers, locally named ‘bantay dagat’, who patrol the coastline of Calatagan. The 
auxiliary invoice is enforced by police outside of Calatagan during transportation of 
fish to Manila (Table 4). Informal discussions with the coastguard and bantay dagat 
revealed that coastline patrols occur one to three times a week, and thrice a week 
for MPAs, with not many illegal activities encountered as “most people [in Calatagan] 
follow the rules”. To triangulate these statements, the perceived ‘likelihood of 
detection’ for non-compliance was measured through structured interviews with 
aquarium fishers (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9: Likelihood of being detected by enforcement for breaking eight de-jure fishery 
rules, as perceived by aquarium fishers in interviews (n=35). 
The findings show that enforcement of de-jure rules appears to be stronger outside 
of Calatagan than within the municipality. 100% of fishers perceived likely detection 
if transporting fish to Manila without an auxiliary invoice; “auxiliary invoices are 
always checked at checkpoints” (Figure 9). This invoice is obtained from the local 
government before transporting collected fish to Manila. During interviews, the 
fishers shared that the fish can leave Calatagan without an auxiliary invoice, yet 
would be unable to reach their exporter as the invoice is enforced on route. 
Throughout the journey the fish must pass through three police checkpoints where 
the bags of fish and paperwork are checked. If the auxiliary invoice is not shown, all 
the fish would be confiscated.  
In comparison, Figure 9 illustrates a broad variation in the fishers’ perceived 
likelihood of detection for non-compliance within Calatagan. For instance, 100% of 
fishers perceived unregistered fishers unlikely to be detected in Calatagan, although 
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unregistered boats are more likely to be detected. During participant observations, 
fishers shared that “fishing in Calatagan is open” to unregistered fishers from other 
municipalities. This portrays a lack of consistency in enforcement. The boundary 
rules do not appear to be strongly enforced; unregistered fishers are not restricted 
and there is also no limit on the number of individuals that can register as fishers in 
Calatagan.  
Notably, use of cyanide and compressors were perceived as the most likely to be 
detected by enforcement within Calatagan. This demonstrates that enforcement in 
Calatagan is focused towards controlling cyanide and compressor use, rather than 
restricting resource users and harvest limits, reiterating the inconsistency of 
enforcement. Fishers also stated that they are “not caught for using cyanide because 
it is not used”. Therefore, it may be that enforcing harvest limits for aquarium fishing 
and restricting resource users is a more complex issue than banning cyanide and 
compressors. Compliance to de-jure rules is influenced by a broader range of factors 
than effective enforcement (Hatcher et al. 2000). Compliance towards cyanide and 
compressor bans may also be driven by factors such as the fisher’s perceptions 
towards de-jure rules (Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010; cf. Tyler 1990; Fishbein and Ajzen 
2010) (see Chapter 6).  
The results show that policy-practice gaps are effected as de-jure rules are translated 
into rules-in-use on the harvester level. The de-facto enforcement in Calatagan is 
inconsistent and varies to de-jure enforcement stated in policies, therefore widening 
the policy-practice gap. This gap may be further increased as inconsistent 
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enforcement could affect the compliance of aquarium fishers to de-jure rules (Keane 
et al. 2008).   
5.2.2. Awareness  
An awareness of de-jure rules among aquarium fishers is important for the rules to 
achieve their purpose (cf. Bitanyi et al. 2012; Kahler and Gore 2012). If awareness 
exists, it would illustrate de-jure rules becoming integrated at the harvester level, 
and therefore they would be more likely to play a part in the de-facto practices of the 
aquarium fishery (cf. Kahler and Gore 2012). 
Figure 10: Fisher’s reported awareness of eight implemented de-jure rules during interviews 
(n=35). 
There was 100% awareness among aquarium fishers for the requirement to register 
as fishers, to register their boats, the need to obtain an auxiliary invoice, and the 
prohibited use of sodium cyanide and compressors (Figure 10). As the auxiliary 
invoice is strongly enforced, and cyanide and compressor bans are the most enforced 
de-jure rules within Calatagan, it is unsurprising that fishers were aware of these 
rules. However, there is high fisher awareness of the need to register as fishers, 
despite unregistered fishers not being monitored or sanctioned. The desire of 
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aquarium fishers to have special collection permits, as they have “asked the local 
government for these”, reveals their wish to be seen by others as legitimate fishers, a 
recurring theme which arose during fieldwork, and could justify their awareness and 
willingness to register. Also, the local government hold meetings, open to all fishers, 
to raise awareness of requirements and prohibited activities. As boat registrations 
and one MPA have only been implemented within the last two years, meetings have 
been conducted to share the implemented de-jure rules. This may explain high 
awareness despite inconsistent enforcement. 
Aquarium fisher’s awareness of de-jure rules for the MPAs and restricted species 
varied. 71% of fishers were aware of five restricted endangered species (seahorses, 
humphead wrasses, sea clams, sharks/rays, grouper species). There was less 
awareness (36%) among the fishers for the prohibited collection of corals (Figure 10). 
The fishers may have less awareness of species restrictions because the aquarium 
trade is consumer driven. From observations and discussions with fishers and the 
exporters, we learnt that they do not receive orders for these species from 
exporters, who may be more aware of restrictions because they will be checked at 
export, so do not need to collect corals and endangered species. An incomplete 
awareness of MPA’s in Calatagan is because not all aquarium fishers will enter areas 
where the MPA’s exist (Figure 10). Of the aquarium fishers who travel to this part of 
Calatagan, 100% were aware of at least one MPA. Nevertheless, two MPA’s are 
implemented and there is confusion among fishers about their exact locations and 
how long each has existed.  
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Overall, there was a high awareness of the de-jure rules implemented for aquarium 
fishers in Calatagan. Meetings run by the local government to raise awareness show 
an effectiveness in fishery management, and indicate interactions between fishers 
and government officials. This is a step towards integrating de-jure rules as rules-in-
use, and reducing policy-practice gaps (Ostrom 1990). Without awareness, de-jure 
rules could not be translated into rules-in-use for the aquarium fishery, and would 
also make it difficult to study the fisher’s compliance and perceptions (cf. Bitanyi et 
al. 2012; Kahler and Gore 2012).  
5.2.3. Licit and Illicit rules 
As they are translated into rules-in-use, de-jure rules are shaped by the community 
to reflect livelihood needs (Schendel and Abrahams 2005). These adaptations may 
become licit rules that match local needs, but in doing so they can also become 
illegal activities (Table 5) (Robbins et al. 2009). Licit and illicit rules are unwritten 
rules derived from social behaviours (Schendel and Abrahams 2005). Licit rules are 
socially sanctioned, or accepted, within the community, while illicit rules are 
unsanctioned (Schendel and Abrahams 2005). Licit and illicit rules interplay with de-
jure rules to create the rules-in-use, which govern the de-facto practices (Ostrom 
1990). For example, the use of a forest reserve in India was governed by de-jure rules 
that were mismatched to community needs. As a result, the de-jure rules were 
altered during integration at the harvester level, and the rules-in-use for the forest 
reserve were actually licit rules that were also illegal (Robbins et al. 2009). However, 
this need not always be the case. Sometimes the de-jure rules become both licit and 
legal rules-in-use, while illegal activities are also illicit (Phelps 2013). Table 5 
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highlights that the Calatagan aquarium fishery is governed by a combination of de-
jure rules and unwritten rules from local communities. In addition to the eight rules 
implemented by the local government for aquarium fishing, there are also seven 
unwritten rules (Table 5). Results from focus group discussions, interviews and 
participant observation, found two unwritten rules among aquarium fishers which 
limit the collection of spawning/breeding fish and small individual fish. These 
activities are illicit yet still legal. In comparison, another two unwritten rules 
restricting entry of the aquarium fishers to certain areas, are themselves illicit among 
the aquarium fishers nor entirely legal. The remaining three unwritten rules are licit 
activities among aquarium fishers, however are also illegal (Table 5). All three of 
these refer to illegal entry of fishers, for instance unregistered fishers into Calatagan, 
entry of Calatagan fishers into other municipalities, and entry into MPAs. In each 
case there are socially sanctioned conditions for these three unwritten rules, such as 
familiarity with the enforcers in question. Table 5 presents these unwritten rules in 
their complementary categories, along with an additional three de-jure rules that are 
licit as well. These refer to the collection methods used in aquarium fishing; fine 
mesh nets are legal and licit to use for aquarium fishing, while cyanide and 






Table 5: The legal/illegal and licit/illicit rules governing Calatagan’s aquarium fishery shared 
by aquarium fisher communities during Focus Group Discussions, qualitative interviews, 
informal discussions and participant observation. 
 Legal Illegal 
Licit The collection and trade of marine reef 
fish for the aquarium trade, provided 
the correct permits have been obtained 
and legal collection methods are used.  
 
The use of fine mesh nets to collect 




Unregistered fishers can enter and fish 
within municipal waters outside 
Calatagan provided they are 
accompanying a relative who is 
registered, and the enforcing officer is 
familiar with the persons in question. 
 
Any unregistered fishers who are not 
residents of Calatagan, are able to 
enter and fish within municipal waters 
provided they are using legal fishing 
methods. 
 
Fishers can enter within the buoys of 
the Marine Protected Area (MPA), if 
they are familiar with the MPA guard.  
Illicit The collection of breeding/spawning 
fish is limited, particularly if the species 
in question are seasonal 
breeders/spawners. (This is knowledge 
possessed by the fishers from 
experience) 
 
The collection of small individuals of 
aquarium species is restricted.  
 
 
The use of the poisonous substance, 
sodium cyanide, and compressor 
tanks for collecting aquarium fish is 
both prohibited and socially 
undesirable. 
 
The restricted entry of aquarium fish 
collectors to waters surrounding two 
barangay within Calatagan.  
 
Restricted entry of all fishers to a strip 
of privately owned beach resorts in 
one barangay. 
 
The illegal entry of fishers to unregistered municipalities and MPAs is a licit rule, 
learnt through informal discussions and interviews with the fishers, where 
exceptions have been identified to de-jure rules depending on the actors’ present (cf. 
Phelps 2013). Entry into the MPAs or a municipality other than Calatagan is possible 
due to familiarity with fellow fishers and enforcers. On the other hand, unregistered 
fishers from elsewhere entering Calatagan have less requirements. The fishers 
shared that “fishers from other municipalities can also enter” and that they “do not 
mind” others entering, provided they fish with legal methods. This exception is also 
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possible due to the lack of consistent enforcement for unregistered fishers in 
Calatagan. The fishers stated that other municipalities differ to Calatagan in their 
fishery management, such as by having stricter boundary rules. Calatagan fishers can 
only enter and fish in places where they are unregistered depending on certain 
conditions, whereas unregistered fishers from elsewhere can enter and fish in 
Calatagan without hindrance. 
Two unwritten rules in Table 5 demonstrate that the aquarium fishers use their own 
social rules to control the harvest of fish. Limiting the collection of 
breeding/spawning fish and small individual fish reduces high mortalities post-
collection. It is also beneficial for the future of the aquarium fishery as fish can 
survive on the reef to grow and reproduce. As this activity is not restricted for 
aquarium fishing under any de-jure rules, the aquarium fishers appear to be using 
social norms to manage the fishery themselves. Such activities were also observed 
during fishing trips with fishers to back up their statements. However, these 
unwritten rules are not acknowledged or legitimised by the local government. 
Cooperation between the fishers and government officials could allow appropriate 
rules to be integrated into fishery management, which match both social and 
ecological needs (cf. Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1999).  
Collection methods which are damaging to the fishery are controlled by both de-jure 
and social rules. The use of cyanide and compressors is illicit among the aquarium 
fishers, as well as being illegal, meaning that their use is socially undesirable and so 
likely to be low. This links back to the enforcement of cyanide and compressors. 
These de-jure rules were perceived as the most enforced in Calatagan, although this 
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could be because they are easier to enforce than other de-jure rules. It is notable 
that the two barangay captains who restricted entry of aquarium fishers, shared that 
they have done so because they perceive aquarium fishing to be detrimental for fish 
in the area. However, damaging collection methods are illicit in the aquarium fishing 
community as well, as shared in an FGD, they are perceived to be “bad for fisher 
health and corals”. Additionally, legally all waters in Calatagan are under ownership 
of the local government, and so barangay do not have the legal power to restrict the 
entry of any registered fishers. In an interview with a government official it was 
verified that “Barangay cannot stop people fishing there, unless they are doing illegal 
activities, as Calatagan only has a municipal ordinance”. 
The findings have shown that, as de-jure rules are integrated on the harvester level, 
they are effected by licit and illicit rules. These unwritten rules can reduce as well as 
widen the gap between de-jure rules and de-facto practices. As cyanide and 
compressor use is illicit its makes compliance to these de-jure rules more likely, while 
de-facto exceptions exist for entry to restricted fishing areas. Negative connotations 
about the aquarium trade have been found at the harvester level and unwritten 
rules, which are not entirely legal, further limit the available collection areas for 
aquarium fishers. These connotations are based on aquarium fishing being 
detrimental to the environment. However, use of damaging techniques is illicit and 
aquarium fishers also have unwritten harvest rules which could increase the 
sustainability of the fishery. 
5.2.4. Non-compliance 
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Compliance is not only influenced by unwritten rules and de-facto exceptions, but 
also by simple rule breaking (Arias 2015). Aquarium fishers (N=35) reported on their 
levels of non-compliance with three de-jure rules: the ban on cyanide use, the ban on 
compressor use, and restrictions on fishing within the MPAs, using both the Bean 
Method and direct questioning. The prevalence of illegal behaviours, were calculated 
as the number of participants answering “yes” in direct questioning (DQ), and 
moving a coloured dice (blue, white or yellow) in the bean method (BM). Under DQ, 
no respondents reported breaking any of the three rules. Under the BM, 5.7% (n=2) 
reported using cyanide, and 5.7% (n=2) reported using compressors to collect 
aquarium fish. Only those participants who were aware of an existing MPA (N=19), 
were questioned about illegal entry. Results from the BM, showed that 10.5% (n=2) 
of participants aware of an MPA admitted to entering one illegally to fish. The Bean 
Method was thus better at detecting reported cases of non-compliance, although in 
small numbers.  
Compliance to the other de-jure rules was also observed and shared by the aquarium 
fishers during fieldwork. No collection or transportation of endangered species and 
corals was observed by researchers. Prohibited species, including corals, are checked 
during exports so are not ordered by exporters in Manila, as they would be fined for 
trading these species. Additionally, the auxiliary invoice is always necessary to 
transport fish to Manila; “cannot pass through check points without an auxiliary 
invoice”. Due to strong enforcement at checkpoints, the fishers would not reach 
their destination without one. All aquarium fishers in the study had registration cards 
for fishing in Calatagan. Two Calatagan aquarium fishers did admit to fishing in a 
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municipality where they were unregistered while sharing a registered friend’s boat, 
which coincides to the conditions of the licit rule.  
These relatively high estimates of compliance reduce the mismatch between de-
facto practices and de-jure rules (Keane et al. 2008). As compliance to the de-jure 
rules means that they can become rules-in-use for the fishery, this helps to minimise 
further policy-practice gaps. Compliance can be explained by economic incentives, 
such as high costs of non-compliance due to strong enforcement (Keane et al. 2008; 
Arias 2015). However, in Calatagan enforcement has been found as inconsistent, and 
so may not justify the levels of compliance found. By taking a broader approach to 
study why harvesters chose to comply, the social influences on compliance behaviour 
in aquarium fishers are explored (cf. Hatcher et al. 2000; Kahler and Gore 2012).  
6. Results and Discussion: Perceptions  
There are many reasons why harvesters choose to comply with environmental 
regulations (Arias 2015). While people often assume this is associated with economic 
costs, harvester perceptions of de-jure rules also come into play (Neilson 2003; 
Hatcher et al. 2000). Positive perceptions can arise when the de-jure rules are aligned 
with the harvesters’ needs (Carmenta et al. 2013; Pascual et al. 2014). For example, 
harvesters may perceive benefits in complying with de-jure rules, perceive legitimacy 
in management, possess social norms which comply with de-jure rules, and the skills 
to align existing de facto practices with de jure rules (Normative Approach, Tyler 
1990; Reasoned Action Model, Fishbein and Ajzen. 2010). These positive perceptions 
can create incentives for voluntary compliance to de-jure rules, and are therefore 
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important for reducing policy-practice gaps (Arias 2015). Voluntary compliance has 
been preferred to coercive compliance via enforcement; it provides a buffer if costly 
enforcement fails, as well as reflecting effective and beneficial management schemes 
(Arias 2015). The findings have illustrated high levels of compliance in Calatagan’s 
aquarium fishery. Therefore, the existence of positive perceptions is studied in this 
chapter to further our understanding of both incentives to comply and how this 
aquarium fishery is managed. 
6.1. Perceived benefits of de-jure rules  
In the Reasoned Action Model, the behavioural beliefs are described as the perceived 
benefits and costs of complying. When the benefits outweigh the costs, incentives 
for voluntary compliance are formed (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). For example, when 
reducing cyanide or compressor use provides more environmental and human 
benefits compared to the costs of smaller catch sizes, fishers would voluntarily 
change to using legal collection methods. During focus group discussions, the 
aquarium fishers were asked to discuss their perceptions of the benefits and 
limitations of implemented de-jure rules. Their average preferences for the 
implemented de-jure rules to continue in the future are displayed on a scale (1-5) 
(Figure 11). Fisher and boat registration were grouped together, as were the 













Figure 11: The aquarium fisher’s average preferences for implemented de-jure rules (n=17). 
The fisher’s overall preferences for de-jure rules to continue average at 3.55, on the 
higher end of the scale. Fishers showed the highest preference to see cyanide, 
compressor bans and species restrictions continue; “the fish can now increase”. This 
is compared to low preferences towards the MPAs; “aquarium fishers cannot enter”. 
The fishers had more neutral preferences towards continued implementation of 
registrations and the auxiliary invoice; they are “expensive” yet “can fish freely in the 
municipality” and “legally transport fish to Manila”.  (Figure 11). Preferences towards 
the cyanide and compressor bans coincide with previous findings that the use of 
these illegal collections methods is also illicit, as well as the high levels of compliance 
towards these de-jure rules (see Chapter 5). Notably, high compliance was also found 
for MPA entry, yet fishers show low preferences for the continuation of this de-jure 
rule. To gather a deeper understanding of the aquarium fisher’s preferences, their 
reasoning behind rule placements was discussed (Table 6).  
 
 
Species MPAs Compressor 
Cyanide 
Would least like to 
keep 
Would most like to keep 
5 3.3 2.7 4.3 1 
 








Table 6. Fishers’ perceived benefits and limitation of de jure rules, based on focus group 
discussions (n=17). 
 
Rule Benefits of Rule Limitations of Rule 
Compressor use Bad for fisher health: less 
mortalities since ban implemented 
Nothing 
Cyanide use Bad for fisher health.  
Fish caught would be thinner and 
weaker 
Both fish and corals would die - can 
increase now 
Nets are easier to use 
Easier to collect some species e.g. 
angelfish 
Species bans Good corals here and needed for 





Can fish freely within Calatagan.  
For identity and safety 
Could fish anywhere before (other 
municipalities) 
Extra expense 
Auxiliary Invoice Able to transport fish legally  Extra expense and price has 
increased over time, although 
price received for fish has not 
Not always by police honoured at 
checkpoints to Manila; time 
wasted and bribes paid 
MPA Nothing Another area restricted for fishing 
(additional to closed barangay and 
private resorts) 
Food fishers can enter 




The aquarium fishers perceive that several existing de jure rules yield both 
environmental and human benefits (Table 6). Therefore, these positive perceptions 
can create incentives to comply. As would be expected, they would prefer to see 
those rules continue, which are perceived to yield more benefits than limitations. 
There is an awareness of the negative impacts cyanide and compressor use has on 
the environment, and on fish survival post-collection. Additionally, aquarium fishers 
show an awareness of the benefits provided by prohibiting coral collection; fishers in 
FGD’s said that “corals are needed for fish survival”. The results reveal that fishers 
are knowledgeable of the factors that will impact marine reef species. This is further 
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demonstrated by their licit rule limiting the collection of small and 
breeding/spawning fish, and their widespread use of legal collection methods (see 
Table 5 and Figure 5).  
To aid in the change of collection methods from illegal to legal techniques, control 
beliefs also play an important role (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). The skills, knowledge 
and time possessed by aquarium fishers will affect how they change their behaviour 
to coincide with de-jure rules, and thus will ease or deter compliance (Hornik et al. 
1995). If aquarium fishers are able to effectively gather their required species with 
























Figure 12: a) The advantages of using saplad, scoop and barrier nets. b) The limitations of 
using saplad, scoop and barrier nets. Based on aquarium fisher interviews (n=35). 
In Calatagan, 100% of aquarium fishers use a combination of nets, the saplad, scoop 
and barrier net, to collect aquarium fish (Figure 5), and all aquarium fisher 
respondents shared advantages of using these methods (Figure 12a). Most of the 
advantages fall into 2 categories; 38% of participants said that the nets are “easy to 




the fish are not damaged by the nets making them stronger and better quality. These 
advantages aid in deterring the use of cyanide and compressors, which are 
environmentally damaging and widely used due to quick and easy collection of fish 
(Rubec 1986; Wabnitz et al. 2003).  
The aquarium fishers were also asked about any limitations of using these nets 
(Figure 12b). The main limitation experienced with the nets is that they can be easily 
broken, for example when they are old or get caught on corals, which results in them 
being difficult to use. One limitation which stood out was the low availability of the 
nets, the saplad net in particular; unless made by the fisher himself or a local net 
weaver, they can be occasionally be found at the exporters, but they are expensive 
to buy. The aquarium fishers require finer mesh than other fishers, which makes 
their preferred nets more difficult to find. Despite a few limitations, all aquarium 
fishers reported preferences for using nets. When these incentives are combined 
with social norms and perceived benefits of banning cyanide and compressors, the 
reasons for high compliance to these two de-jure rules becomes clearer. 
Most negative perceptions towards de-jure rules seem to be driven by limited 
collection areas (Table 6). Fishers can only legally fish within Calatagan because of 
the required fisher and boat registrations, then there are the unwritten rules banning 
aquarium fishing in two barangay within Calatagan. The addition of MPAs is 
perceived by the fishers as another restriction rather than an environmental benefit, 
especially as aquarium fishers are the only type of municipal fisher not permitted to 
use the MPA’s outer “sustainable use zone” (Table 6). Inconsistent enforcement of 
the MPAs, combined with a low awareness of among the fishers, could mean that 
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the MPAs are not currently effective in providing widely seen environmental benefits 
(see Chapter 5). This lack of perceived benefits and more restricted fishing areas, 
would suggest low compliance to the MPAs. However, the differences in perceptions 
towards MPAs compared to cyanide and compressor bans, is not reflected in their 
compliance estimates.  
Compliance with de-jure rules for registrations were also observed. Through 
registering, the fishers shared a feeling of recognition as legitimate fishers, and even 
a wish to obtain special collection permits for aquarium fishing; “[the fishers] have 
asked for this but it is not given”. Aquarium fishers are treated differently to food 
fishers, for instance in their additional restricted fishing areas. Discussions with the 
fishers revealed that local government policies in other municipalities had 
completely prohibited aquarium fishing. The director of Provincial BFAR was unaware 
of any aquarium fishers in the Batangas province, assuming that Calatagan had also 
prohibited the livelihood. The aquarium fishers stated that the local government of 
Calatagan have threatened to ban aquarium fishing due to concern over its damaging 
effects on the environment. Therefore, there are likely large costs of non-compliance 
among the aquarium fishers; if they displayed low levels of compliance to de-jure 
rules, the local government may be more inclined to prohibit aquarium fishing. 
However, aquarium fishers in Calatagan have shown a range of incentives for not 
using damaging and illegal collection methods, so the negative connotations they 
possess may be unjustified. Also, the fear of their livelihood being prohibited 
suggests a coercive, rather than a voluntary, incentive to comply (cf. Arias 2015).  
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Voluntary compliance, which stems from an alignment between de-jure rules and 
local livelihood needs, is more effective for long term success of management 
schemes (Cinner and Huchery 2013; Pascual et al. 2014). By considering the social 
influences on compliance and engaging with the aquarium fisher community, the 
local government could create management schemes with more desirable incentives 
(Katon et al. 1999; Challender and MacMillan 2014). Therefore, the rules-in-use 
would better reflect the de-jure rules, and the policy-practice could be reduced in the 
long term.  
6.2. Perceived legitimacy of de-jure management 
As the findings have shown so far, various incentives from the Reasoned Action 
Approach exist to support compliance towards cyanide and compressor bans (see 
Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). However, they may not explain the high compliance found 
to other de-jure rules. For instance, no evidence of social norms was found for these 
rules and fishers did not perceive them as yielding as many benefits. To further 
understand the high compliance of aquarium fishers, the normative approach is 
explored more deeply (see Tyler 1990). Other than social norms, the normative 
approach encompasses perceptions of legitimacy (Arias 2015). If perceived 
legitimacy exists in aquarium fishery management, the fishers are more likely to 
accept managing authorities and their de-jure rules, thus also increasing voluntary 
compliance (cf. Stern 2008; Kahler and Gore 2012). This occurs when fairness and 
trust are formed between fishers and government officials, and is improved when 
both parties are involved management schemes (Ostrom 1990; Tyler 1990).  
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6.2.1. Fairness and trust 
Fairness and trust are important aspects for voluntary compliance (Stern 2008). 
Studies show these perceptions arise during personal experiences (Neilson 2003; 
Stern 2008). Perceptions of fairness and trust towards management authorities in 
the aquarium fishery, including the coastguard, bantay dagat and local government, 
were investigated from the perspectives of aquarium fishers and invertebrate 
collectors in Calatagan (Table 7). 
Table 7: Positive and negative perceptions of the fairness and trust in aquarium fishery 
management authorities, coded from key informant interviews (n=26) and participant 
observation narratives from aquarium fisher communities (n=49). 
Positive Perceptions No. of 
mentions 
Negative Perceptions No. of 
mentions 
The rules equally affect all of 
those involved: 
“Prohibited activities are 
for everyone” 
16 The rules do not equally affect 
all those involved: 
“Not everyone follows 
the rules”, 
“Government do not 
see things equally” 
7 
Bantay dagat possess the right 
skills to do their job: 
“They would not be in 
that position if did not 
possess right skills” 
 
10 Aquarium fishers are treated 
differently: 
“Two barangay closed 
to aquarium fishers”, 
“Aquarium fishers 
cannot enter the MPA, 
but other fishers can”, 
“Not being given a 
special permit to collect 
aquarium fish”, 
“Lack of government 
attention for aquarium 
fishers” 
4 
Local government allow aquarium 
fishing: has been banned 
elsewhere: 
“Trust the local 
government because they 
allow aquarium fishing” 
8 Unequal power: 
“You are stronger if 
know people inside 
government, weaker if 
you do not” 
4 
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Familiar with bantay dagat and 
coastguard: 
“See them patrolling in 
the sea” 
“Do not harass the 
fishers”, 
“Ask kindly to inspect 
their boats” 
7 No experience with the local 
government, coastguard or 
bantay dagat 
4 
Rules are for the fisher’s benefit 3   
Bantay dagat and coastguard 
follow the rules too 
2   
Total  46 Total  19 
 
As Table 7 portrays, there is a divide in the positive and negative perceptions of 
fairness and trust towards management authorities. For instance, contradictions in 
most the frequently mentioned categories; that de-jure rules equally effect everyone 
involved, while they are also unequal. In this case, it appears that the de-jure rules 
are equal within the aquarium fisher community, and on a wider aspect are not 
equal for everyone in Calatagan; as stated by a fisher “not everyone follows the 
rules”. For example, the MPA was perceived as unequal as it is open to tourism and 
other fishers can use the “sustainable use zone”, while “aquarium fishers cannot 
enter”. If awareness has not been not raised over the potential benefits of MPAs, it 
can result in ambiguity over its purpose. On the other hand, several fishers reported 
that they know the de-jure rules are for the fishers’ benefit. These perceptions 
coincide with previous findings, that the aquarium fishers recognize benefits of the 
de-jure rules, however they are treated differently to other types of fishers by the 
local government. Despite this inequality, many aquarium fishers seem satisfied with 
being allowed to perform their livelihood as the local government has not prohibited 
aquarium fishing (Table 7). For instance, in a key informant interview it was said that 
“[fishers] trust the local government because they have not banned aquarium 
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fishing”. This finding reiterates that aquarium fishers fear their livelihood being 
banned which can induce coercive incentives to comply, due to the high costs that 
could occur if they were to display widespread non-compliance.  
Most categories for positives perceptions refer to trust in the enforcers: the bantay 
dagat and coastguard. Participants are familiar with these groups and trust seems to 
have arisen from positive personal experiences, such as being treated “kindly” by the 
coastguard and bantay dagat (Table 7). Yet, there are also negative perceptions 
towards them. A small number of aquarium fishers mentioned having little trust in 
the enforcers and local government as they have no experience of them (Table 7). 
This strengthens the point that personal experiences affect perceptions of legitimacy. 
For instance, a lack of interaction or negative experiences will drive perceptions of 
distrust and unfairness (Stern 2008). This in turn can influence decisions to comply 
(Arias 2015). The discovery of some fairness and trust towards management 
authorities could indicate perceptions of legitimacy, and hence incentives to comply 
among aquarium fishers (cf. Tyler 1990). As personal experiences are found to 
influence these perceptions of legitimacy, the involvement of fishers in management 
could also affect their compliance (cf. Stern 2008).  
6.2.2. Harvester and government involvement 
Perceptions of legitimacy can be improved with more interactions between 
aquarium fishers and management authorities (cf. Tyler 1990). Therefore, fisher 
involvement in aquarium fishery management, such as in de-jure rule design and 
enforcement, would increase perceptions of legitimacy (cf. Tyler 1990; Nielson 
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2003). Previous studies have also shown that more direct involvement of fishers in 
resource management would improve levels of compliance (Hatcher et al. 2000; 
Cinner et al. 2012). Thus, involvement of the aquarium fishers in managing the 
fishery may contribute to the high levels of compliance found in Calatagan. 
In Calatagan, key informants in the aquarium fisher communities (n=26), rated their 
overall involvement in fishery management an average of 2.26 (1-5 scale); rare, and 
government involvement as 2.10, also rare. On the other hand, government officials 
(n=3) rated both aquarium fisher and government involvement an average of 3.67; 
frequent. The way in which aquarium fishers and local government are involved in 
aquarium fishery management were further explored (Table 8).  
Table 8: Ways in which aquarium fishers and invertebrate collectors, from key informant 
interviews (n=26) and participant observations (n=49), reported: a) fisher involvement and 
(b) local government involvement in managing the aquarium fishery. Shaded boxes show the 
categories shared by government officials in interviews (n=3).  
a) Aquarium fisher involvement Number 
of 
mentions 





Aquarium fishers fish unitedly: 
talk/meet when collecting and 
transporting fish 
 
9 No consultations with the 
government:  
“Just told what the rules 
are, they are not 
discussed”,  
“Not consulted about 
increase in auxiliary 
invoice price” 
14 
Invited to local government 
meetings: raising awareness 
about prohibited activities 
8 Not involved in designing or 
enforcing the rules 
7 
Conflict Resolution: fishers talk 
among selves to work out 
problems 
“Rare to have conflict”, 
“Like a family and can 
resolve problems easily” 
7 Do not manage among selves:  
“Only pack together”, 
“Just do our own fishing” 
5 
Aquarium fishers do not collect 
spawning/breeding fish, or those 
below minimum size 




a) Aquarium fisher involvement Number 
of 
mentions 





Protect resources: use legal 
techniques and do not destroy 
corals 
3   
Total 33 Total 28 
 










Always give out the auxiliary 
invoice for legal 
transportation of fish 
10 Lack of local government support 
(financial and technical): 
“Government only sit in 
municipal hall”, 
“Not giving special permit 
after a long time of 
asking”, 
“Do not do anything for 
aquarium fishers: nets 
given to other fishers”, 
“Focus on other activities 
e.g. seaweed farming, 
mangroves) 
23 
Enforcement of prohibited 
activities: cyanide, 
compressors, dynamite, 
destruction of corals (bantay 
dagat) 
9 Meetings are insufficient:  
“Rare”,  
“No outcome”,  
“Only when the 
government want to say 
something” 
9 
Local government meetings: 
raise awareness of prohibited 
activities and correct fishing 
techniques:  
“Twice a year” 
8 Local government not strictly 
implementing or monitoring rules, 
only the bantay dagat 
4 
Design the rules 6   
Local government support: 
have not banned aquarium 
fishing, invertebrate collectors 




5   
Conflict resolution:  
Barangay Chairman will hold 
meetings and provide fish 
packing areas 
3   




Other than attending government meetings, the fishers are not involved in any de-
jure processes or government supported management as they are “just told what the 
rules are”. Among the aquarium fishers, there was a divide in how they perceived 
themselves; several had the opinion that they manage themselves by “talking before 
doing anything” and “not collecting small or pregnant fish”, while others shared that 
they work alone and only coordinate to transport fish because they have no 
“organisation”. (Table 8). Nevertheless, aquarium fishers shared that when conflict 
arises within the community, issues would usually be resolved amongst themselves, 
as they are “like a large family”.  Social norms exist in their use of legal fishing 
techniques, care to not destroy coral, and limited collection of small and breeding 
fish, which the local government are unaware of (Table 8).  Therefore, the aquarium 
fishers to appear to have their own methods of managing the aquarium fishery, even 
though this is not recognised by the local government.  
In many cases of decentralised resource management, the local authorities to not 
represent the needs of local communities (Ribot et al. 2010). The authorities may be 
indifferent to local harvester communities and have their own profit driven interests 
for managing resources (Ribot et al. 2010). In Calatagan, aquarium fishers make up 
only a small proportion of all the fishers, and so this livelihood may procure less 
revenue for the local government. The lack of attention given to aquarium fishers 
becomes apparent during discussions about local government involvement, and is an 
aspect the local government agree upon. Both aquarium fishers and government 
officials stated that the government focus on supporting and managing other 
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livelihoods (Table 8). For instance, local government officials stated that “there is no 
active implementation of rules for aquarium fishers” and that “BFAR are not involved 
in the aquarium fishery here”. The negative connotations and spread in other 
municipalities banning aquarium fishing, may provide few incentives for Calatagan’s 
local government to devote time and resources on managing the aquarium fishery. 
The findings show a lack of interaction between aquarium fishers and local 
government, and do not provide perceptions of legitimacy (Table 8). Rather, these 
findings support the idea that incentives to comply may stem from the cost of losing 
an aquarium fishing livelihood. Although this is a strong incentive, it can be less 
desirable than incentives for voluntary compliance. For instance, it has arisen from 
negative perceptions and does not reflect constructive relationships between fishers 
and government (cf. Arias. 2015). More incentives for voluntary compliance would 
indicate that de-jure management is accepted by the aquarium fisher community, 
and better suited to local livelihood needs (see Cinner and Huchery 2013). This would 
allow effective management of the aquarium fishery and continue to provide 
livelihoods in the future.  
Decentralised management which involves the local harvesters can have social and 
environmental benefits (Ribot et al. 2010; Cinner et al. 2012). For example, when 
local harvesters and managing authorities work together, it can benefit local 
livelihoods, improve compliance and even increase fish abundance (Cinner et al. 
2012). As a result, this form of decentralised management would have positive 
outcomes for the sustainability of the fishery. Evidence of this was not found for 
Calatagan’s aquarium fishery, and existing local management may not be able to 
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ensure sustainability for the future. Authorities in local government will design and 
enforce de-jure rules, however we have seen failures to implement de-jure rules for 
aquarium fishing, such as harvest limits and closed seasons (Table 8) (see Chapter 5). 
Consequently, insufficient involvement of both aquarium fishers and local 
government in de-jure management, combined with the threat of banning aquarium 
fishing, could make the aquarium fishery unlikely to persist into the future.  
7. Results and Discussion: Management for Future Use 
People often assume that compliance with the rules leads to sustainability. However, 
as Ostrom reminds us, there are many other factors at play in resource management 
(Ostrom 1990). The way in which resources such as fisheries are managed relies on 
more than simply compliance. A theme Ostrom continuously uses for successful and 
sustainable resource management is the involvement of harvesters (Ostrom 1990; 
Ostrom 1999; Ostrom 2009). The aquarium fishers in Calatagan have little 
involvement in de-jure management the aquarium fishery. Notably, Calatagan’s local 
government are also rarely involved in directly managing the fishery (Table 8). 
Additionally, policy-practice gaps are observed as national and local policies are 
translated into rules-in-use, for example, in the implementation of de-jure rules and 
consistent enforcement (see Chapter 5). These findings initiate a deeper look at the 
effectiveness of aquarium fishery management. The benefits which fishers perceive 
in de-jure rules have been shown as an important incentive for compliance (see 
Chapter 6). Therefore, the perceived benefits and limitations for future use of the 
aquarium fishery are also explored. Together with fisher perceptions and the 
106 
application of Ostrom’ eight principles, the effectiveness of existing management for 
future use of the aquarium fishery is investigated.  
7.1. Benefits and limitations of existing management 
Members of the aquarium fisher communities (n=26) reported, that under the way 
the aquarium fishery is currently management, it is only “a little likely” to provide 
livelihoods in the next 10 years, with an average rating of 2.03 (1-5 scale). To justify 
their ratings, the participants were asked to expand on any benefits or limitations for 
the fishery’s future use (Table 9). This encompasses design and enforcement of the 
eight de-jure rules, local unwritten rules, local government support, and any issues 
commonly shared among the aquarium fishers.  
Table 9: Aquarium fishers and invertebrate collectors reported benefits and limitations for 
future use of the aquarium fishery, during key informant interviews (n=26) and participant 
observation (n=49). 
Reported Benefits No. of 
mentions 
Reported Limitations  No. of 
mentions 
Prohibited use of destructive 
methods (e.g. cyanide and 
compressors): good for coral and 
fisher’s health 
12 Overharvest of fish: many 
fishers, fish populations 
declining, fish unable to 
reproduce 
20 




“Can move around 
Calatagan” 
6 Collection areas are reduced: 
closed barangay and MPAs in 
Calatagan, and cannot go 
outside Calatagan 
15 
Can collect aquarium fish freely 
in Calatagan: 
"Has not been stopped 
yet" 
5 Low prices received for fish at 
exporters 
10 
There are still many fish to 
collect in Calatagan 
5 Lack of government support:  
"[Aquarium fishers] 




Aquarium fishers do not collect 
spawning/breeding fish, or those 
below minimum size 
3 Illegal activities in the past 
and still now (e.g. cyanide, 




Auxiliary invoice helps to 
transport fish legally 
2 Tourist resorts: release 
chemicals into sea (e.g. 
chlorinated pool water) 
4 
  Expenses: fisher and boat 
registrations, auxiliary invoice, 
transportation 
4 
  The auxiliary invoice is not 
always honoured by police at 
checkpoints: ask for bribes 
3 
  No new generations of 
aquarium fishers 
2 
Total 33 Total 69 
 
Table 9 highlights the issue of overharvest limiting future use of the fishery, as “there 
used to be many more fish”, Calatagan’s fish populations are in decline because they 
“cannot reproduce”. Also, there are many fishers of different types working in 
Calatagan, yet interestingly, a reduced number of aquarium fishers as no new 
generations are taking up the livelihood and “many have stopped aquarium fishing” 
due to more livelihoods in the tourism industry (Table 9). This reflects the 
interrelated nature of different fisheries, and that the pressure on coral reefs is not 
only from aquarium fishing (MacPherson 2017). Detrimental environmental impacts 
are added to by mentions of negative effects from tourist resorts and illegal 
dynamite fishing, neither of which are the result of aquarium fishing (Table 9). 
Several aquarium fishers and invertebrate collectors raised the issue that “beach 
resorts put chlorinated water into the sea, that effects fish and invertebrates”. 
However, a few fishers commented that there are “still many fish to collect”, despite 
decreasing abundances. Environmental benefits were once again perceived in de-jure 
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rules banning illegal collection methods (cyanide and compressors) as aquarium 
fishers are aware that this “protects the coral”. Additionally, the aquarium fishers 
perceive their own licit rule as beneficial for the environment; “we do not collect 
pregnant fish and only those of the right size”. (Table 9). This illustrates that the 
aquarium fishers share an awareness of sustainable fishing practices.  
The perceived limitations for future use of the fishery, vary between environmental 
and social impacts. For instance, limited collection areas for aquarium fishers and the 
destruction of corals (Table 9). Several fishers perceived the lack of support from 
local government as making aquarium fishing less likely to continue in the future. 
This will influence future livelihood choices, as if aquarium fishers are not given 
financial and technical support they may be inclined to move to alternative 
livelihoods which gain support from the local government. Such cases have already 
by seen, as the numbers of aquarium fishers in Calatagan are decreasing. A shared 
benefit for future use was that local government still permits aquarium fishing. 
Several aquarium fishers felt that the local government “would like to stop aquarium 
fishing”. It seems unusual for this to be thought of as a benefit and not merely a way 
of life, as is granted for food fishers. This reflects a difference in how aquarium 
fishers are perceived by others. Yet, the aquarium fishers of Calatagan have shown 
use of legal collection methods, while taking care to protect the coral reef.  
In Calatagan, gaps between policy and practice first appear at the local government 
level (see Chapter 5), as do some limitations for future use of the aquarium fishery. 
The lack of implemented rules specific to aquarium fishing are an example of this. 
The local government “focus on other livelihoods, like seaweed farming”, and have 
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little control over the amount of fish harvested for the aquarium trade; this is driven 
more by consumer demand. Also, the data shows that there is no support from the 
local government or involvement of aquarium fishers in de-jure management, to 
allow the design and enforcement of de-jure rules that could reflect both the needs 
of aquarium fishers and environmental conditions (Ostrom 2009). Therefore, the 
future of Calatagan’s aquarium fishery is not certain.  
7.2. Effective management for future use 
Effective management schemes would be relevant to both environmental and social 
needs (Ostrom 2009; Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010). As aquarium fishers perceive the 
fishery as unlikely to continue in the next 10 years, existing management may fail to 
address both the environmental and social aspects. Therefore, despite high 
compliance and low use damaging collection methods, the management of 
Calatagan’s aquarium fishery would need improving to ensure its existence in the 
future. As resource management is a complex task with many interplaying factors, 
priority areas for improvement can be identified (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Fabinyi 
and Dalabajan 2010; Pomeroy et al. 2010). For instance, Ostrom (1990) constructed 
eight principles for effective resource management, obtained from examples of 
enduring CPR institutions, which have succeeded in gaining acceptance among 
generations of harvesters. Table 10 illustrates whether Calatagan’s management of 
its aquarium fishery supports Ostrom’s eight principles.
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Table 10: Ostrom’s eight Principles for effective CPR management, as seen in Calatagan’s aquarium fishery (Ostrom 1990; Mills et al. 2013) 
Ostrom’s Principles Description Supported in Calatagan? 
Clearly Defined Boundaries Individuals or boundaries who have rights to withdraw 
resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as 
must the boundaries of the CPR itself. 
Yes, there are municipal boundaries for fishery resources, 
and those with access rights must register with their local 
government. 
However, in practice the boundaries are not actively 
enforced in Calatagan, as unregistered fishers have been 
known to enter.  
Congruence between 
appropriation and provision 
rules, and local conditions 
Harvest rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or 
quantity of resource units are related to local conditions 
and to provision rules requiring labour, material and/or 
money. 
No, government management has little knowledge about 
the aquarium fishers.   
Aquarium fishery management does not address harvest 
limits or temporary closures. Harvest is controlled by 
consumer demand. Marine Protected Areas exist but are 
opposed, with varied awareness of their implementation 
and benefits. Yet, prohibited collection methods are 
accepted by local communities, due to perceived direct and 
indirect benefits.  
Collective-choice arrangements Most individuals affected by the operational rules can 
participate in modifying the operational rules. 
No, aquarium fishers are not involved in designing and 
implementing fishery rules. 
Monitoring Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and harvester 
behaviour, are accountable to the harvesters or are the 
harvesters. 
No, aquarium fishers are not involved in any monitoring or 
enforcement of rules. Although, the use of cyanide and 
compressors is socially undesirable. 
Enforcement is carried out by the coastguard and bantay 
dagat but perceived as inconsistent. 
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Graduated Sanctions Harvesters who violate operational rules are likely to be 
assessed by graduated sanctions (depending on 
seriousness and context of the offence) by other 
harvesters, by officials accountable to these harvesters, or 
by both. 
No, aquarium fishers are not involved in enforcement and 
do not give eachother sanctions. 
In practice, graduated sanctions exist for four rules: 
unregistered boats, compressor use, the collection of 
corals and endangered species. However, sanctions are not 
clearly defined in policies and there are varied accounts in 
practice. They are instigated by coastguard, bantay dagat 
and local government.  
Conflict-resolution mechanisms Harvesters and their officials have rapid access to low-cost 
local arenas to resolve conflicts among harvesters or 
between harvesters and officials. 
No, the local government does not have a conflict-
resolution mechanism.  
Conflicts are rare and mostly resolved within the 
community among aquarium fishers. At serious times, the 
barangay captain will mediate due to his familiarity with 
the fishers.  
Minimal Recognition of rights to 
organise 
The rights of harvesters to devise their own institutions are 
not challenged by external government authorities. 
No, only the local government have authority to design and 
implement rules.  
Aquarium fishers possess licit rules for aquarium fishing, 
such as controlling collection of small and 
breeding/spawning fish. These are not recognised by local 
government.  
Nested enterprises Harvest, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution and governance activities are organised in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
Yes, there are different levels within Philippine government 
(municipal (local) to national). Levels in the aquarium 
trade’s market chain are managed by these different levels 
in government.  
For example, municipal government manage local harvest 
and national government manage global exportation. 
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Calatagan’s existing management for the aquarium fishery supports two out of 
Ostrom’s eight principles (Table 10). This includes nested enterprises, as levels of the 
aquarium trade are governed by respective levels in the Philippine’s decentralised 
government, and secondly the clearly defined boundaries for resource use. However, 
in practice the defined municipal boundaries for Calatagan are poorly enforced; 
“fishing in Calatagan is open” thus counteracting its purpose (Figure 9). Some of the 
perceived limitations for future use of the fishery are reflected in the lack of 
Ostrom’s principles found in existing management (see Table 9 and 10). This is 
mainly because aquarium fisher involvement in management, such as in designing, 
monitoring and enforcing fishery rules, is absent. Moreover, local government are 
unaware of, and “do not consider”, their social unwritten rules as a legitimate form 
of management (Table 8). Fish collection, transportation and conflict resolution are 
handled by the fishers, showing an ability to manage and coordinate themselves. 
(Table 8).  
These findings highlight areas that need improvement in aquarium fishery 
management. Increasing the involvement of aquarium fishers in de-jure 
management could address some problems. As well as allowing more of Ostrom’s 
principles to be met, more fisher involvement can improve positive perceptions and 
incentives for voluntary compliance (cf. Ostrom 1990; Tyler 1990; Cinner et al. 2012). 
Increased support from the local government would also be advantageous. Aquarium 
fishing could become a more desirable livelihood, thus slowing the decrease in 
aquarium fisher numbers. The local government could learn more about the 
aquarium fishers, such as livelihood needs and legitimise the fisher’s unwritten rules 
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for fish collection (cf. Katon et al. 1999; Grafton 2000). Therefore, more 
communication between local government and aquarium fishers would aid the 
implementation of de-jure rules aligned with both social and environmental 
conditions. Thus, improving the effectiveness of management for future use of the 
fishery (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Katon et al. 1999; Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010). 
8. Conclusion  
This study provides a snapshot in time of an aquarium fishery in the Philippines. It 
explores policy-practice gaps, fisher perceptions of de-jure rules, and the pitfalls of 
management which limit fishery use in the future. The negative connotations 
associated with aquarium fishing are well known, such as the use destructive cyanide 
fishing (Wabnitz et al. 2003). Findings show that these connotations also exist at the 
harvester level and influence how local government will manage aquarium fisheries.  
From aquarium fisher accounts, it was learnt that several municipalities in the 
Philippines have prohibited aquarium fishing. However, findings from Calatagan 
show that the use of illegal cyanide fishing is low, thereby contradicting 
environmental concerns. Results from Calatagan have shown that aquarium fishers 
are aware of de-jure rules and perceive benefits in several de-jure rules, which can 
influence their compliance. Perceptions that compressor and cyanide bans yield 
environmental benefits have resulted in social rules making their use illicit and high 
compliance to these de-jure rules (see Chapter 5 and 6). This compliance helps to 
align policy and practice, as the rules-in-use are better matched to de-jure rules.  Yet, 
the local government in Calatagan have threatened to prohibit this livelihood, and 
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currently aquarium fishers are treated differently to food fishers. The aquarium 
fishers receive less support from the local government, and few de-jure rules are 
implemented specifically for aquarium fishing. For example, in the absence of 
Aquatic Wildlife Special Use permits, and local specifications to de-jure rules do not 
consider species in the aquarium trade (see Chapter 5). In doing so, policy-practice 
gaps begin to emerge at the government level. Prohibiting aquarium fishing may 
appear to be the simpler choice when it comes to managing a complex resource, 
where illegal practices have negative impacts on the environment (Rubec 1988; 
Muallil et al. 2013). However, the aquarium trade provides livelihoods for 
communities in developing countries (Wabnitz et al. 2003).  
Voluntary compliance to de-jure rules would indicate that the rules are aligned to 
local livelihood needs, therefore being more effective in the long-term than coercive 
compliance (Keane et al. 2008; Arias 2015). Despite, aquarium fishers perceiving 
benefits in some of the de-jure rules, perceived legitimacy is found to be low. This 
stems from a lack of cooperation between the fishers and local government, and 
could result in de-jure rules being misaligned to local livelihood needs (Ostrom 1990; 
Cole 2014). Both fisher and government involvement in managing the aquarium 
fishery was reported as rare. The lack of cooperation between aquarium fishers and 
local government in managing the fishery can impact on its future use (see Chapter 
7) (Cinner et al. 2012). Aquarium fishers reported that the fishery was unlikely to 
exist in the future because of limitations in existing management (see Chapter 7). In 
combination with the absence of most of Ostrom’s effective management principles, 
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this highlights that existing aquarium fishery management needs improvements to 
provide livelihoods in the future (Ostrom 1990). 
By using a comparison of the bean method and direct questioning to estimate 
compliance, the theoretical implications of this study show the effectiveness of 
indirect questioning techniques, such as the bean method, for investigating sensitive 
topics. Also, two frameworks for studying social influences on compliance are 
combined to integrate a wide range of perceptions. The results show that both these 
frameworks hold important characteristics for studying social perceptions about 
management schemes and their effect on compliance.  
The results imply that existing fishery management has low cooperation between the 
aquarium fishers and local government. Few interactions reduce perceptions of 
legitimacy and effect the alignment between de-jure rules and livelihood needs, and 
thus the acceptance of management schemes among fishers (Ostrom 1990; Katon et 
al. 1999). The absent principles for effective resource management focus largely on 
the involvement of the aquarium fishers in de-jure fishery management (Ostrom 
1990). Grey areas are also observed in the principles, with informal management 
schemes among the aquarium fishers not being considered. Low cooperation 
between the fishers and local government result in the social rules, used by fishers to 
manage their fishery, not holding any legal power. Involving the aquarium fishers in 
designing, monitoring and enforcing de-jure rules, means that management schemes 
can be better aligned to local conditions (cf. Ostrom 2009; Cinner and Huchery 2010). 
Increasing the fisher’s involvement would allow policy-practice gaps to be addressed; 
de-jure rules can be implemented which focus on managing the aquarium fishery (cf. 
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Ostrom 1990; Cinner et al. 2012). For example, the absence of implementing special 
collection for aquarium fishers means national government agencies are unaware of 
aquarium fishers in Calatagan and that the perceive aquarium fishers themselves as 
lacking legitimacy. The implication of implementing this de-jure could increase 
support for the aquarium fishers and communication between fishers and 
government. Also, social rules previously not considered by the government could be 
acknowledged and legitimised, such as collection restrictions for breeding and small 
fish. As a result, the local government would recognise the fisher’s unwritten rules 
(cf. Grafton 2000). The lack of involvement local government has in managing the 
aquarium fishery has also been reported (see Chapter 6). As cooperation increases, 
the local government’s perceptions of the aquarium fishers could similarly improve. 
Through greater familiarity with each other and a clearer understanding of de-facto 
practices in aquarium fishing, the negative connotations in Calatagan may be 
removed. Subsequently, aquarium fishers may receive government support in a 
similar way to food fishers. 
These findings can be applied to other aquarium fisheries. The negative connotations 
of aquarium fishing would appear in other exporting countries (MacPherson 2017). 
Other aquarium fisheries may not have high rates of compliance, and so a 
comparison of their perceptions and rules-in-use would be interesting for future 
research projects (Fabinyi and Dalabajan 2010). De-jure rules for managing natural 
resources will always require integration into rules in use (Ostrom 1990; Robbins et 
al. 2009). Structured analysis of policy-practice gaps can also be used in other forms 
of resource management. Overall, extending this study to more aquarium fisheries 
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would allow for further triangulation of findings. Understanding the rules-in-use for 
one fishery and highlighting important areas to improve is a positive step. For more 
effective analysis of the fishery such as the overharvest of Calatagan’s fish 
populations, as noted by aquarium fishers, underwater surveys would be useful to 
assess fisheries. For notable progress, research on fisheries for the aquarium trade 
needs expanding. For example, creating an in-depth value chain for aquarium fish by 
applying more research to the exporter links in the chain. The socioeconomics of 
aquarium fishers would provide data on drivers for an aquarium fishing livelihood, 
and heterogeneity of the fishers means that individuals will hold different 
motivations and perceptions. In taking research questions further, concerns for the 
sustainability of the aquarium trade can attempt to be resolved.  
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Appendix 1: Focus Group Discussion Questions 
1. Rules in the Aquarium Fishery: each question (a-e) represent a table column 
a. Awareness 
i. Are there any places where you are not allowed to fish for the aquarium 
trade? 
Prompt: Why are you not allowed to fish there?  
If no mention of other resource users:  Are there any competitor users of the 
local coral reef? E.g. fishers for food, tourist resorts 
ii. We’ve talked about restrictions on the areas where you collect fish: 
Are there any other rules or regulations that affect your fishing?  
Prompt: species that cannot be collected, techniques which cannot be used, 
any permits needed for aquarium fishing? 
(in table: 1 for awareness of rule, 0 for none, and add rows for additional 
rules) 
b. Enforcement 
i. Does anything happen if these are not followed? 
(in table: 1 in column two for awareness or 0 for no enforcement, penalty in 
column 3, e.g. imprisonment, fines, verbal warning) 
ii. What would happen? 
iii. Who is responsible for enforcing this rule? 
c. Origins 
i. Who made this rule? 
ii. How did you hear about it? 
d. Exceptions 
i. Are there any times or situation when these rules do not apply? 
ii. Are there any social customs or traditions you follow as aquarium fishers 
e. Involvement 
i. Is there any consultation with the government about the fishery 
management?  e.g. deciding on rules, enforcing, meetings? 
ii. Any fisherfolk organisations for aquarium fishers? 
2. Rule preferences: Group activity using large sheet, with scale and cut out 
cards of identified rules.  
a. Which of these two rules you prefer to see continue? (two rules cards at a 
time) 
Place on scale: of ‘Most like to keep’ to ‘Least like to keep’ 
Next rule: Would you prefer to see this rule continue more or less than … 
(pick a rule already on scale) 
Repeat for each rule cue card  
Photograph sheet. 
b. What do you would you say are some good things about these rules? 
c. Would you say there are any problems with these rules? 
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Appendix 2: Fisher Interview Questions 
1. First Interview: saturation sample 
Ppt number:     In FGD: YES/NO 
1.1. Awareness of rules for collecting aquarium fish 
a. Fishing techniques. Fill in table below 
i. Could you describe to me the techniques you use to collect aquarium fish? 
X in table 









Saplad  Condom 
net 
Cyanide Compressors Other 
X       
ii. Are there any advantages or disadvantages to using these techniques?  
b. Fishing boundaries 
i. Are there any restrictions by local government, on where you can go to 
collect aquarium fish? 
(Possible examples: Unregistered municipalities, Marine Protected Area) 
ii. Do you collect fish close to the buoys for the Marine Protected Area? 
Yes… No…. Don’t know …. 
c. Species  
i. Do you know of any species of fish, coral or other organisms, that are not 
be collected for the aquarium trade?  
 
ii. Do you know why you cannot collect these species? 
 
d. Exceptions 
Could you please describe if there are any times or situations, when these do not 
apply? 
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2.1. Effectiveness of Enforcement.  
a. Have you reported somebody for breaking any of these rules before? 
 
b. Of these rules for the aquarium fishery, do you know what would happen 
if the rule was not followed? (option for ‘UNSURE’) 
c. If someone does not follow this rule, what are chances they will be 




b. If known, what would the 
penalty be? 






Registration of boats   




Species restrictions    
Compressor use   
Cyanide use   
d. Do you know whether enforcement activities increase, when there are 
many aquarium fishers not following a rule? 
Don’t know …..  
Prompt: Could you please tell me about a time when this happened? 
e. Do you know if penalties become more severe, if someone is caught not 
following the same rule multiple times?  
Don’t know ….. 
Prompt: Could you please tell me about a time when this happened? 
 
3.1. Bean Method 
“We have talked about how other people collect aquarium fish, this time I would 
like to ask a little about you” 
This game is completely anonymous and any answers will not be able to single you 
out as an individual, everything you answer is pooled together with all other 
respondents. 
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The dice will not be counted until all interviews have been completed, and results 
will not be reported to any authorities for your protection” 
Bean Method. CYANIDE (yellow), MPA (blue), COMPRESSORS (white) 
i. If you have [used cyanide] please move a [yellow] bean from the large jar to 
the small jar. 
ii. If you have not [used cyanide], please move a black bean from the large jar to 
the small jar. 
 
 
2. Second Interview: Key Informants (purposive sample)  
Ppt number: …. Role in aquarium trade: ……………... Gender: …………. Age group …… 
(<35/35-60/>60) 
1. Benefits of the rules 
a. Is there anything you like or dislike about the way this aquarium fishery is 
managed, for example by the local government? 
Prompt: any consideration of livelihoods 
Don’t know ….. 
b. Would you like to see any changes to how this aquarium fishery is run? 
Don’t know ….. 
c. Are there any issues effecting the future use of this aquarium fishery? 
 
d. Under the current way this fishery is managed, how well do you think it will 
provide aquarium fish as a livelihood in the next 10 years, . 
For example, when your [children/grandchildren/great grandchildren] would 
be old enough to collect aquarium fish? [Delete as appropriate] 
Don’t Know …. 
Not at all (1), A little (2), Somewhat (3), Mostly (4), Completely (5) 
e. Do you think there are any ways in which this aquarium fishery is managed 
now, that ensure it will be a good livelihood for future generations?  
 
f. Do you think there are any ways the management of this aquarium fishery 
could be improved, to ensure that it will be a good livelihood for future 
generations?  
 
2. Legitimacy of the rules 
2.1. Fairness  
a. Do you believe that the local government rules equally affect all the people 
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involved in this aquarium fishery? 
Prompt: Why do you say that? For rule design, enforcement? 
2.2. Trust 
b. If you have a concern about fishery, such as seeing someone not following a 
rule or conflict with another fisher, how are those issues resolved? 
 
c. How would you describe your trust in the local government, and enforcers of 
the rules? For example, Bantay Dagat, PNP, Coastguard. 
 
2.3. Involvement in fishery management 
a. What is your, and the fishers, role in managing this aquarium fishery?  
Prompt: consulting with government (e.g. for designing rules, enforcement, 
meetings), managed amongst fishers themselves, outcome of involvement, FARMCs?  
Code after: 
Active ….. Passive…. Both ….. None …..  
i. Overall, would you say the fishers are involved in managing the fishery   
Not at all (1), Rarely (2), Occasionally (3), Frequently (4), Always (5) 
ii. Do you think, the fishers feel that they can manage this aquarium 
fishery themselves, or do they feel that there is a need for government 
for this? 
 
b. What is the local governments role in managing this aquarium fishery?  
Prompt: Could you please describe how they are involved? Any consultations about 
rules? Offers of financial or technical support? 
Code after: 
Active ….. Passive ….. Both ….. None …..  
i. Overall, would you say the government are involvement in managing 
the fishery 
Not at all (1), Rarely (2), Occasionally (3), Frequently (4), Always (5) 
 
Appendix 3: Government Interview Questions 
1. Structured Government Interview: Rules for the Aquarium Fishery  
a. Origins 
i. Could you tell me how the rules are made for the aquarium fishery?  
Prompt: The process: decision making. Are BFAR involved? 
 
ii. How are rules made known to the aquarium fishers?  
129 
Prompt: any consultations/meeting? 
b. Awareness and enforcement: each question represents a column in a table 
Referencing rules from the table: 
These are some of the rules we know are in place for the aquarium fishery, are there 
others you would like to add? Add rows to table is needed 
i. Are the rules clear about what is or what is not allowed?  
ii. Who made this rule?  
iii. Since when has this rule been implemented? 
iv. Do you know who this rule applies to?  
v. Do you when this should be followed, for example, are there any times or 
situations when it does not apply? 
vi. Are these rules enforced? 
vii. Who enforces this rule?  
viii. What happens if someone is seen breaking this rule to collect aquarium 
species?  
ix. If someone was not following this rule, how often would they be caught?  
x. And receive the penalty? 
c. Effectiveness of enforcement 
i. Do enforcement activities become more common when there are aquarium 
fishers not following a rule? 
Don’t know …..  
Prompt if needed: Could you please tell me about a time when this happened? 
ii. Do punishments become more severe for individual aquarium fishers, when 
they break a rule more than once?  
Don’t know ….. 
Prompt: Could you please tell me about a time when this happened? 
 
2. Semi-Structured Government Interview: Perceptions of the Rules  
1. Demographics 
a. Gender 
b. Position in government 
c. Level of government 
2. Benefits of the rules 
a. Is there anything you like or dislike about the way this aquarium fishery is 
managed?  
Prompt: for considering peoples livelihoods 
Don’t know ….. 
b. Would you like to see any changes to how this aquarium fishery is run? 
Don’t know ….. 
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c. Are there any issues effecting the future use of this aquarium fishery? 
Don’t know….. 
d. Under the current way this fishery is managed, how well do you think it will 
provide aquarium fish as a livelihood in the next 10 years, for future 
generations? 
Don’t Know …. 
Not at all (1), A little (2), Somewhat (3), Mostly (4), Completely (5) 
e. Do you think there are any ways in which this aquarium fishery is managed 
now, that ensure it will be a good livelihood for future generations?  
 
f. Do you think there are any ways the management of this aquarium fishery 
could be improved, to ensure that it will be a good livelihood for future 
generations?  
 
3. Legitimacy of the rules 
a. Fairness  
i. Do you believe that the local government rules equally affect all the people 
involved in this aquarium fishery? 
Prompt: Why do you say that? For rule design, enforcement? 
b. Trust 
i. Do you know how issues are resolved if aquarium fishers have a concern 
about the fishery, for example conflict with another fisher or seeing someone 
not following a rule? 
ii. How would you describe your trust in the aquarium fisher community? 
 
c. Involvement in fishery management 
i. What is your, and the [local/provincial/national] governments, role in 
managing this aquarium fishery?  
Prompt: for designing rules, enforcement, meetings. BFAR involvement here for 
aquarium fisheries? Outcome of involvement? Offers of financial or technical 
support? 
Code after: 
Active ….. Passive…. Both ….. None …..  
ii. Overall, would you say the [local/provincial/national] government are 
involved in managing the fishery   
Not at all (1), Rarely (2), Occasionally (3), Frequently (4), Always (5) 
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iii. What is the aquarium fishers role in managing this aquarium fishery? 
Prompt: design of rules, enforcement, meetings, consulting with government?  
Managed amongst fishers. Fisherfolk organisation for aquarium fishers? Outcome of 
involvement? 
Code after: 
Active ….. Passive ….. Both ….. None …..  
iv. Overall, would you say the fishers are involvement in managing the aquarium 
fishery: 
Not at all (1), Rarely (2), Occasionally (3), Frequently (4), Always (5) 
v. Do you think the fishers can manage the aquarium fishery themselves, or do 
you feel there is a need for government to do this? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
